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Article

Adaptive Management in the Courts
J.B. Ruhl† and Robert L. Fischman††
INTRODUCTION
Adaptive management has become the tonic of natural resources policy. With its core idea of “learning while doing,”1
adaptive management has breathed life and hope into a policy
realm beset by controversy, uncertainty, and complexity. It offers what many believe is needed most in a world bombarded
by ecological deterioration of massive scales—expert agencies
exercising professional judgment through an iterative decisionmaking process emphasizing definition of goals, description
of policy decision models, active experimentation with monitoring of conditions, and adjustment of implementation decisions
as suggested by performance results. This ideal has become infused into the natural resources policy world to the point of
ubiquity, surfacing in everything from mundane agency per† Matthews & Hawkins Professor of Property, Florida State University
College of Law.
†† Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. The authors are grateful for the research support of the Florida State University College of Law and Indiana University Maurer School of Law. Suggestions from
Mary Jane Angelo, Alex Camacho, Holly Doremus, Forrest Fleischman, Daniel
Schramm, and Sandi Zellmer corrected errors and improved our analysis. The
authors thank Jennifer Morgan from the Indiana University Law Library, and
students Abigail Dean, Lindsey Hemly, Andrew Hoek, Angela King, and Jeremiah Williamson for research assistance. Please direct comments and questions to jruhl@law.fsu.edu or rfischma@indiana.edu. Copyright © 2010 by J.B.
Ruhl and Robert L. Fischman.
1. Professor Holly Doremus explains:
[A]ctive learning is rarely incorporated into the resource management
process. For iterative or related decisions, where there is no “safe”
choice, precaution and science are not in tension. Both point us toward an incremental framework for decision making that emphasizes
learning. We might call that framework adaptive management, but
. . . I prefer the more descriptive phrase “learning while doing.”
Holly Doremus, Precaution, Science, and Learning While Doing in Natural Resource Management, 82 WASH. L. REV. 547, 550 (2007). For more detail on
what “learning while doing” entails, see infra Part I.
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mits2 to grand presidential proclamations.3 Indeed, it is no exaggeration to suggest that these days adaptive management is
natural resources policy.
But is it working? Does appending “adaptive” in front of
“management” somehow make natural resources policy, which
has always been about balancing competing claims to nature’s
bounty, something more and better? Many legal and policy
scholars have asked that question, with mixed reviews.4 Their
2. For example, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) has proclaimed
it will use adaptive management in administering habitat conservation plan
(HCP) permits it issues pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (ESA). This
will be done as a means to “examine alternative strategies for meeting measurable biological goals and objectives through research and/or monitoring, and
then, if necessary, to adjust future conservation management actions according to what is learned.” Final Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning
and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 64 Fed. Reg. 11,485, 11,486 (Mar. 9,
1999). As one FWS official explained:
We will continue to incorporate contingency planning within all types of
HCPs. In the future, HCPs will have improved structure in their adaptive management strategies . . . . Increased structure in adaptive management strategies will require increased vigilance on the part of permittees and the Service during implementation of long-term plans; this
reflects the nature of the conservation partnership created by HCPs.
Marj Nelson, The Changing Face of HCPs, 25 ENDANGERED SPECIES BULL. 4,
7 (2000).
3. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,508, 74 Fed. Reg. 23,099, 23,101–03 (May
12, 2009) (directing the EPA to draft pollution-control strategies for the Chesapeake Bay watershed that are “based on sound science and reflect adaptive
management principles,” while also directing the Departments of the Interior
and Commerce to use “adaptive management to plan, monitor, evaluate, and adjust environmental management actions” in the Chesapeake Bay watershed).
4. See Mary Jane Angelo, Stumbling Toward Success: A Story of Adaptive Law and Ecological Resilience, 87 NEB. L. REV. 950, 951–52 (2009) (detailing the theory of adaptive management through a case study based in Florida); Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a
Study in Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 294 –99 (2007) (critiquing the use of adaptive management in the ESA); Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges of “New Age” Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 50–52
(2001) (identifying challenges for adaptive management in the administration
of the ESA); Robert L. Glicksman, Ecosystem Resilience to Disruptions Linked
to Global Climate Change: An Adaptive Approach to Federal Land Management, 87 NEB. L. REV. 833, 871 (2009) (proposing the broad use of adaptive
management in public land management); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Panarchy
and Adaptive Change: Around the Loop and Back Again, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. &
TECH. 59, 70–71 (2005) (examining the theory of active adaptive management); J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It Possible?, 7
MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 21, 33–34 (2005) (identifying disconnects between
adaptive management and conventional administrative procedure); Annecoos
Wiersema, A Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and Goals in
Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239, 1239 (2008)
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evaluations, however, have rested on theory,5 program-specific
surveys,6 and focused case studies.7 No study has comprehensively explored and extracted lessons from what likely matters
significantly to the natural resource agencies practicing adaptive management—how is it faring in the courts? We do so in
this Article.
Part I of this Article examines the theory, policy, and practice of adaptive management, focusing on the experience of the
federal resource management agencies. From theory to policy
to practice, at each step forward in the emergence of adaptive
management something has been lost in the translation. The
end product is something we call “a/m-lite,”8 a watered-down
version of the theory that resembles ad hoc contingency planning more than it does planned “learning while doing.” This
gap between theory and practice leads to profound disparities
between how agencies justify decisions and how adaptive management in practice arrives at the courthouse doorsteps.

(arguing that adaptive management by agencies pays insufficient attention to
substantive goals).
5. See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 4, at 69–74 (examining the theories
of passive and active adaptive management).
6. The use of adaptive management to implement ESA programs has received considerable attention. See, e.g., Camacho, supra note 4, at 293; Doremus, supra note 4, at 50–52; J.B. Ruhl, Taking Adaptive Management Seriously: A Case Study of the Endangered Species Act, 52 KAN. L. REV. 1249, 1250–51
(2004).
7. See, e.g., Angelo, supra note 4, at 966–90 (Lake Apopka in Florida);
Melinda Harm Benson, Adaptive Management by Resource Management Agencies in the United States: Implications for Energy Development in the Interior
West, 28 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 87, 92–95 (2010) (Bureau of Land
Management energy development on federal public lands in Wyoming); Melinda Harm Benson, Integrating Adaptive Management and Oil and Gas Development: Existing Obstacles and Opportunities for Reform, 39 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,962, at 10,962 (2009) (oil and gas development in Wyoming); Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Beyond Conjecture: Learning About Ecosystem Management
from the Glen Canyon Dam Experiment, 8 NEV. L.J. 942, 944 –49 (2008) (Glen
Canyon Dam adaptive management project); John H. Davidson & Thomas
Earl Geu, The Missouri River and Adaptive Management: Protecting Ecological Function and Legal Process, 80 NEB. L. REV. 816, 820–33 (2001) (Missouri
River); Alfred R. Light, Tales of the Tamiami Trail: Implementing Adaptive
Management in Everglades Restoration, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 59, 69–89
(2006) (Florida Everglades); Lawrence Susskind et al., Collaborative Planning
and Adaptive Management in Glen Canyon: A Cautionary Tale, 35 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1, 7–23 (2010) (Glen Canyon Dam adaptive management project).
8. “a/m-lite” is a stripped-down version of adaptive management that often fails due to management, implementation, and planning problems. See infra text accompanying notes 69–70.
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In Part II, we review how these disparities have played out
in courts. We consider claims that agency practice of adaptive
management has not lived up to either its theoretical promise
or to the legal demands of substantive and procedural law. Our
overall assessment is that, although courts genuinely and often
enthusiastically endorse adaptive management theoretically,
they frequently are underwhelmed by how agencies implement
adaptive management in the field. We extract three key themes
from the body of case law in this respect: (1) larger-scale plans
are more likely to incorporate adaptive management plans that
withstand judicial scrutiny than are smaller-scale ones; (2) the
practice of tiering site-specific environmental impact analyses
to an earlier, overarching, cumulative study is well suited to
adaptive management, and adaptive management can reduce
the need for supplemental analyses; and (3) adaptive management procedures, no matter how finely crafted, cannot substitute for showing that a plan will meet substantive management
criteria required by law.
The pool of judicial opinions on adaptive management is
still limited in scope, leaving many questions unanswered and
providing only a partial playbook for how agencies should move
forward. In Part III, therefore, we extend from the existing case
law to draw lessons for both Congress and agencies about the
future practice of adaptive management. The message for Congress is straightforward—provide more funding and clearer
standards. With neither option likely in the foreseeable future,
agencies cannot as a practical matter hope to practice a fully
realized version of adaptive management theory. Our message
to agencies, however, is that even compromised adaptive management, in the form of a/m-lite, can be an effective decision
method—and one that survives judicial scrutiny. But, in order
for that to be the case, agencies must be more disciplined about
its design and implementation. This includes resisting the
temptation to employ adaptive management to dodge burdensome procedural requirements, committing to substantive
management criteria, and engaging contentious stakeholder
participation.
I. THE THEORY, POLICY, AND PRACTICE OF ADAPTIVE
MANAGEMENT
Adaptive management has moved amazingly fast from
theoretical drawing board to policy marketing plan to practice
production line. Along the way, however, it has been watered
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down to a weak lemonade of ad hoc contingency planning.
Adaptive management as practiced by the federal resource
management agencies just does not seem to have quite the
same refreshing appeal as adaptive management in theory. In
this Part of the Article, we explore this gap and identify the
tensions it poses for adaptive management in the courts.9
A. THEORY
Over the past two decades, natural resources policy has
gravitated to a model of nested, ever-changing, complex ecosystems, the essence of which demands a management policy
framework every bit as dynamic as the ecosystems it seeks to
manage.10 This rapidly solidifying framework, known as ecosystem management, focuses on natural resources as ecologically
functioning landscape units rather than as disassembled
parts—the trees, the water, the grassland, the species, and so
on.11 To achieve this goal, ecosystem management intends to
move decisionmaking from a process of setting rigid standards
based on comprehensive rational planning to one of experimentation using continuous monitoring, assessment, and recalibration. The dominant of these new decision methods emerged in
9. This Part builds on themes developed in J.B. Ruhl, Adaptive Management for Natural Resources—Inevitable, Impossible, or Both?, 54 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 11-1, 11-2 (2008).
10. The development of natural resources law has taken many of its cues
from environmental and ecological sciences, which themselves have evolved
over time. See Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847,
847–54 (1994). With ecology in particular, the trend over the past half-century
has been increasingly to focus on the complex flux qualities of ecosystems and
to place less emphasis on conceptions of stasis and natural stability. See Reed
F. Noss, Some Principles of Conservation Biology, as They Apply to Environmental Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893, 893 (1994) (“Among the new paradigms in ecology, none is more revolutionary than the idea that nature is not
delicately balanced in equilibrium, but rather is dynamic, often unpredictable,
and perhaps even chaotic.”); see also Bryan Norton, Change, Constancy, and
Creativity: The New Ecology and Some Old Problems, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 49, 49 (1996); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Law and the New Ecology:
Evolution, Categories, and Consequences, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325, 326–27 (1995).
11. For the seminal works developing ecosystem management theory and
policy, see Norman L. Christensen et al., The Report of the Ecological Society
of America on the Scientific Basis for Ecosystem Management, 6 ECOLOGICAL
APPLICATIONS 665, 665–66 (1996), and R. Edward Grumbine, What Is Ecosystem Management?, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27, 27 (1994). The legal contours of ecosystem management are comprehensively explored in JOHN
COPELAND NAGLE & J.B. RUHL, THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT (2d ed. 2006).
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the theory of adaptive management C.S. “Buzz” Holling and his
co-authors laid out in the influential book from the late 1970s,
Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management.12
Holling and his fellow researchers found conventional environmental management methods, particularly the environmental impact analysis process that lies at the core of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),13 at odds with the
emerging model of ecosystem dynamics. They focused on the
basic properties of ecological systems to provide the premises of
a new assessment and management method.14 Under a dynamic model of ecosystems, they concluded, management policy
must put a premium on collecting information, establishing
measurements of success, monitoring outcomes, using new information to adjust existing approaches, and a willingness to
change.15 The traditional management approach of natural resources policy was “to attack environmental stressors in piecemeal fashion, one at a time,” and to parcel decisionmaking “out
among a variety of mission-specific agencies and resourcespecific management regimes.”16 In contrast, the adaptive
management framework is more evolutionary and interdisciplinary, relying on iterative cycles of goal determination, model
building, performance standard setting, outcome monitoring,
and standard recalibration. Indeed, advanced versions of adaptive management incorporate an experimentalist research element, in which management actions deliberately probe for information to evaluate testable hypotheses about the effects of
active intervention in ecological processes, such as evaluating
the effects a chosen habitat management action and its alternatives might have on invasive species by running small-scale
test plot experiments.17
Adaptive management has evolved well beyond an idea.
Indeed, from the earliest emergence of ecosystem management
12. C.S. HOLLING ET AL., ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND
MANAGEMENT (C.S. Holling ed., 1978); Kai N. Lee & Jody Lawrence, Restoration Under the Northwest Power Act: Adaptive Management: Learning from the
Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 16 ENVTL. L. 431, 442 n.45
(1986) (tracing the term “adaptive management” to Holling’s book).
13. NEPA is explored in more detail supra Part III.
14. HOLLING ET AL., supra note 12, at 25–37.
15. Id. at 1–21.
16. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information Deficits in Environmental Regulation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1439 (2008).
17. See CARL WALTERS, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE
RESOURCES 232 (1986); Karkkainen, supra note 4, at 70–71.
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policy, there has been broad consensus among resource managers and academics that adaptive management is the only practical way to implement ecosystem management.18 Recently, for
example, the National Research Council branch of the National
Academy of Sciences convened a committee of scientists to explore how adaptive management might be used to improve resource agency decisionmaking for ecosystem management in
the Klamath River Basin, which straddles southern Oregon
and northern California.19 The basin had been beset for decades
with water management conflicts pitting farming, fishing, tribal, recreational, and species interests in constant battle.20 Noting there had been “little effort to implement adaptivemanagement strategies in the Klamath basin,”21 the committee
synthesized the theoretical formulations to date to outline eight
key steps of adaptive management: (1) definition of the problem, (2) determination of goals and objectives for management
of ecosystems, (3) determination of the ecosystem baseline, (4)
development of conceptual models, (5) selection of future restoration actions, (6) implementation and management actions, (7)
monitoring and ecosystem response, and (8) evaluation of restoration efforts and proposals for remedial actions.22 The committee’s description of the last stage provides some flavor of how
adaptive management differs from conventional natural resources management in the way Holling and his fellow researchers deemed most important:
After implementation of specific restoration activities and procedures,
the status of the ecosystem is regularly and systematically reassessed
and described. Comparison of the new state with the baseline state is
a measure of progress toward objectives. The evaluation process feeds
directly into adaptive management by informing the implementation
18. See Ronald D. Brunner & Tim W. Clark, A Practice-Based Approach to
Ecosystem Management, 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 48, 56 (1997); Anne E.
Heissenbuttel, Ecosystem Management–Principles for Practical Application, 6
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 730, 732 (1996); Paul L. Ringold et al., Adaptive
Management Design for Ecosystem Management, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS
745, 745–46 (1996). Indeed, the Ecological Society of America’s comprehensive
study of ecosystem management treats the use of adaptive management methods as a given. See Christensen et al., supra note 11, at 670.
19. See COMM. ON ENDANGERED & THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH
RIVER BASIN, ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER
BASIN: CAUSES OF DECLINE AND STRATEGIES FOR RECOVERY 1–3 (2004). In the
interests of full disclosure, Professor Ruhl served on the so-called Klamath
Committee.
20. See id. at 17–45.
21. Id. at 335.
22. See id. at 332–35.
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team and leading to testing of management hypotheses, new simulations, and proposals for adjustments in management experiments or
development of wholly new experiments or management strategies.23

By contrast, the committee observed that “[e]cosystem
management in the Klamath basin typically has pursued the
widely recognized alternatives to adaptive management: deferred action and trial and error involving crisis management.”24 These approaches magnify losses to resources, undervalue information, and overvalue action for action’s sake.25
While an adaptive management approach would need to adhere
to legal constraints of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and
established water rights, the committee identified a number of
management innovations that could take pressure off the water
management conflicts, such as water banks and reoriented
agency management structures and processes.26
B. POLICY
Federal resource management agencies have had difficulty
translating the theoretical descriptions of adaptive management into policy. Rather than elaborating on the theoretical
framework by providing details for implementation of the eight
steps of adaptive management, agencies adopting adaptive
management have gone in the reverse direction, condensing the
policy of adaptive management into the bumper-sticker sized
slogan of “learning while doing.”27
For example, one of the first movers on adaptive management, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), has employed
this definition of adaptive management in its policy guidance
for the ESA permit program since 2000:
Adaptive management is an integrated method for addressing uncertainty in natural resource management. It also refers to a structured
process for learning by doing . . . . Passive adaptation is where information obtained is used to determine a single best course of action.
Active adaptation is developing and testing a range of alternative
strategies. The Services believe that both of these types of adaptive
management are appropriate to consider when developing a strategy
to address uncertainty. Therefore, we are defining adaptive manage23. Id. at 335.
24. Id. at 336.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 340–43. For a thorough history of the basic controversy in
the Klamath basin dispute, including the impact and aftermath of the Committee report, see HOLLY DOREMUS & A. DAN TARLOCK, WATER WAR IN THE
KLAMATH BASIN (2008).
27. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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ment broadly as a method for examining alternative strategies for
meeting measurable biological goals and objectives, and then, if necessary, adjusting future conservation management actions according
to what is learned.28

Similarly, the Department of the Interior (DOI), in its
Adaptive Management Technical Guide, defines adaptive management using a long-winded version of the “learning while
doing” theme adopted from the National Research Council:
Adaptive management [is a decision process that] promotes flexible
decision making that can be adjusted in the face of uncertainties as
outcomes from management actions and other events become better
understood. Careful monitoring of these outcomes both advances
scientific understanding and helps adjust policies or operations as
part of an iterative learning process . . . . It is not a “trial and error”
process, but rather emphasizes learning while doing.29

The mantras of “learning while doing” and “learning by
doing” may capture the essence of adaptive management, but
these phrases hardly convey how to do it. The picture gets no
clearer as one moves from policy guidance to formal regulatory
definitions. For example, the joint regulation for compensatory
wetland mitigation—promulgated in April of 2008 by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps) and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA)30—defines adaptive management as
the development of a management strategy that anticipates likely
challenges associated with compensatory mitigation projects and provides for the implementation of actions to address those challenges,
as well as unforeseen changes to those projects. It requires consideration of the risk, uncertainty, and dynamic nature of compensatory
mitigation projects and guides modification of those projects to optimize performance. It includes the selection of appropriate measures
that will ensure that the aquatic resource functions are provided and
involves analysis of monitoring results to identify potential problems
of a compensatory mitigation project and the identification and implementation of measures to rectify those problems.31

The U.S. Forest Service’s 2008 rule on national forest
planning,32 which drips with references to adaptive management, provides even less definitional detail:
28. Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed.
Reg. 35,242, 35,252 (June 1, 2000) (internal citations omitted).
29. BYRON K. WILLIAMS ET AL., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT: THE U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR TECHNICAL GUIDE, at v (2009).
30. See Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed.
Reg. 19,594 (Apr. 10, 2008).
31. 33 C.F.R. § 332.2 (2009).
32. National Forest System Land Management Planning, 73 Fed. Reg.
21,468 (Apr. 21, 2008).
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Adaptive management: A system of management practices based on
clearly identified outcomes and monitoring to determine if management actions are meeting desired outcomes; and, if not, to facilitate
management changes that will best ensure that outcomes are met or
re-evaluated. Adaptive management stems from the recognition that
knowledge about natural resource systems is sometimes uncertain.33

The point is that these and other legal definitions of adaptive management have done little to pin down what makes
natural resources management “adaptive” for purposes of
measuring and evaluating agency decisions. Further content is
not generally supplied in agency substantive and procedural
regulations. For example, section 404 of the new Clean Water
Act’s wetland compensatory mitigation program regulations requires applicants to develop adaptive management plans as
part of a larger, permitting process and use it to guide decisionmaking over relevant permit time frames.34 Thus, among
33. 36 C.F.R. § 219.16 (2009) (emphasis removed). This rule is currently
enjoined by Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 632
F. Supp. 2d 968, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2009), and the Forest Service has requested
public input on what direction the planning rule should take. See National Forest System Land Management Planning, 74 Fed. Reg. 67,165, 67,166 (Dec. 18,
2009). The Forest Service adopted the same definition in its August 2007 proposed rules updating its procedures for NEPA compliance. See National Environmental Policy Act Procedures, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,998, 46,003 (Aug. 16, 2007).
States do little better. California defines adaptive management, in the context
of wildlife conservation planning, as “us[ing] the results of new information
gathered through the monitoring program of the plan and from other sources
to adjust management strategies and practices to assist in providing for the
conservation of covered species.” CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2805(a) (West
2010). A Minnesota statute implementing the Great Lakes compact defines it
as “a water resources management system that provides a systematic process
for evaluation, monitoring and learning from the outcomes of operational programs and adjustment of policies, plans and programs based on experience
and the evolution of scientific knowledge concerning water resources and water dependent natural resources.” MINN. STAT. § 103G.801(1.2) (2010). Adaptive management in Oregon means “applying management or practices over
time and across the landscape to achieve site specific resource goals using an
integrated and science based approach that results in changes over time in response to feedback or monitoring.” OR. REV. STAT. § 541.351(1) (2010). In Washington it means simply “reliance on scientific methods to test the results of actions taken so that the management and related policy can be changed promptly
and appropriately.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 76.09.020(1) (West 2010).
34. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, jointly administered by the Army
Corps of Engineers (Army Corps) and the EPA, establishes a program to regulate the discharge of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States,
including wetlands. Activities in waters of the United States regulated under
section 404 include fill for development, water resource projects (such as dams
and levees), infrastructure development (such as highways and airports), and
mining projects. Section 404 requires a permit before dredged or fill material
may be discharged into waters of the United States, unless the activity is exempt from section 404 regulation (e.g., certain farming and forestry activities).
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the regulatory requirements for “planning and documentation”
in mitigation plans, the rule requires compilation of an “adaptive management plan” to “guide decisions for revising compensatory mitigation plans and implementing measures to address
both foreseeable and unforeseen circumstances that adversely
affect compensatory mitigation success.”35 With the requirement of adaptive management plans in hand, however, the rule
does not go much further in explaining how they are to be designed and implemented, leaving it to the local Army Corps
“district engineer, in consultation with the responsible party
(and other federal, tribal, state, and local agencies, as appropriate), [to] determine the appropriate measures.”36 The upshot
of the rule is that the adaptive management plan will be used
when needed, at which time the district engineer and regulated
party will figure out how to adapt.
This wait-and-see approach hardly seems what Holling and
his adaptive management theory progeny have in mind. Rather
than require plans that build in the objectives, hypotheses,
models, standards-information flows, and transparency of
adaptive management, these rules leave the actual content of
plans undetermined and the practice of adaptive management
up to the opaque post-permit contacts between local Army
Corps officials and permittees. This is indicative of how an
elaborate theory has descended into a vague promise of future
adjustments without clear standards. The litigation described
in Part II provides many other examples of this devolution from
theory to a/m-lite.37
Some of the open-ended qualities of the Army Corps’ adaptive management policy could be explained as necessary given
the nature of section 404 as regulating primarily private lands
and actions38—meaning the Army Corps takes proposed actions
as they come and cannot know ahead of time how adaptive
management can be effectively designed. But the story is little
better for federal public land management agencies. There is no
shortage of stakeholders interested in how public lands are
managed and plenty of opportunities exist for them to chalSee Wetland Regulatory Authority, U.S. EPA OFF. WATER, http://water.epa.gov/
type/wetlands/outreach/upload/reg_authority.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
35. 33 C.F.R. § 332.4(c)(12) (2009).
36. Id. § 332.7(c)(3).
37. See infra Part II.
38. Jason Scott Johnston, The Tragedy of Centralization: The Political
Economics of American Natural Resources Federalism, 74 U. COLO. L. REV.
487, 620 n.361 (2003).
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lenge agency decisions. The U.S. Forest Service and the DOI
have led the way toward adaptive management among federal
land management agencies. The Forest Service positioned
adaptive management as the driver in its 2008 “environmental
management systems” (EMS) rules for national forest planning,39 and the DOI adopted a broad adaptive management policy for all its agencies in March 2007.40 Still, details are lacking.
The Forest Service’s 2008 rule, for example, touts adaptive
management over twenty times in the preamble,41 but only
twice in the rule text: once to define it,42 and once to proclaim it
is the essence of land management planning,43 but never to explain how it is implemented. Instead, the agency adopted the
concept of “environmental management systems” to, in theory
(according to the preamble), capture all that is part of adaptive
management and more.44 The agency said it “believes incorporating EMS in the planning rule better integrates adaptive
management and EMS in Forest Service culture and land
management planning practices.”45
The DOI approach is in one sense more substantive but in
others more indirect. The DOI has proposed, as part of its rules
implementing NEPA, that all its agencies adopt adaptive management, but does not therein define adaptive management or
prescribe the contents of adaptive management plans.46 Rather,
the March 2007 DOI policy mandates use of a “technical guide”
to define what adaptive management is and how an agency is
39. National Forest System Land Management Planning, 73 Fed. Reg.
21,468, 21,469 (Apr. 21, 2008) (emphasizing the need for a forest system management rule that “[p]romotes the use of adaptive management”).
40. See Secretary of the Interior, Order No. 3270, § 2 (Mar. 9, 2007) (“Consideration of [adaptive management] is warranted when: (a) there are consequential decisions to be made; (b) there is an opportunity to apply learning; (c)
the objectives of management are clear; (d) the value of reducing uncertainty
is high; (e) uncertainty can be expressed as a set of competing, testable models; and (f ) an experimental design and monitoring system can be put in place
with a reasonable expectation of reducing uncertainty.”).
41. National Forest System Land Management Planning, 73 Fed. Reg.
at 21,469–505.
42. 36 C.F.R. § 219.16 (2009).
43. Id. § 219.3(a) (“Land management planning is an adaptive management process that includes social, economic, and ecological evaluation; plan
development, plan amendment, and plan revision; and monitoring.”).
44. Id. § 219.5.
45. National Forest System Land Management Planning, 73 Fed. Reg.
at 21,475.
46. Using Adaptive Management, 43 C.F.R. § 46.145 (2009).
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to implement it.47 The DOI adaptive management website
presents a series of case studies to illustrate the technical guide
in action, with contexts including multiple use lands, wildlife
refuges, national forest restoration projects, and the Glen Canyon dam.48 The guidance and the case studies do provide useful
practical suggestions for adaptive management, but they do not
aggregate into a coherent policy. The DOI nonetheless believes
this approach “has great promise as an effective means to address significant resource management challenges under conditions of uncertainty.”49 That, of course, will depend on how it is
put into practice.
C. PRACTICE
Natural resource law is as much the management of conflict as it is the management of public lands, waters, or species.
The first generation of litigation over adaptive management
highlights two key disparities that are likely to exacerbate conflict and misunderstanding as agencies attempt to translate
theory into action. One disparity arises from the different values evident in law and management. The other disparity separates scholarly adaptive management theory50 from actual federal agency practice.
1. Perspectives on Agency Decisionmaking: Law Versus
Management
Modern U.S. administrative law and many of the environmental statutes enacted over the past forty years value the
transparency and certainty of two-step decisionmaking. The
first step is the pluralist debate during which groups comment
on draft documents and debate various alternatives. The
second step is the final agency action, when the government
throws the switch and makes the decision it will implement
and defend if challenged in court. The legal system regards the
point of final agency action as a phase change when the fluid

47. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 29, at v.
48. See Adaptive Management In Use, U.S. DEPARTMENT INTERIOR, http://
www.doi.gov/initiatives/AdaptiveManagement/casestudies.html (last modified
Sept. 14, 2010).
49. Secretary of the Interior Order No. 3270, supra note 40, § 2.
50. For a discussion of adaptive management theory, see supra text accompanying notes 12–17.
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period of deliberation ends and implementation/defense of a
fixed record and plan of action begins.51
This decision method relies on two central attributes: (1)
use of “front-end” analytical tools comprehensively conducted
and concluded prior to making the decision final, and (2) the
assumption of a robust capacity to predict and assess environmental impacts and overall costs and benefits of a proposed action.52 For example, regulations promulgated under the ESA
provide for consultations between the FWS and other federal
agencies about the impacts of actions on protected species.
These regulations require the FWS to “[e]valuate the effects of
the action and cumulative effects” and decide “whether the action, taken together with cumulative effects, is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of listed species.”53 In other
words, the FWS must decide, once and for all, whether an action taken today will jeopardize a species at some point in the
future. The agency may revisit its decision only if the action
remains subject to continuing federal control and either new information or modifications of the action present effects that
were not previously considered.54

51. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419–20
(1971) (holding that a record contemporaneous with agency deliberation must
document the consideration of relevant factors supporting the decision—
justifications offered after the final agency action cannot provide the legal
support to uphold an agency action).
52. Professors Sidney Shapiro and Robert Glicksman have produced a rich
body of scholarship exploring the “front-end” prediction approach to environmental agency decisionmaking. See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L.
GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH,
at x (2003) (suggesting that pragmatism, rather than utilitarianism, is the
“appropriate baseline from which to design and implement risk regulation”);
Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Improving Regulation Through Incremental Adjustment, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179, 1179 (2004) (advocating a
shift in focus from “front-end” regulatory adjustment to “back-end” regulatory
improvements, including use of adaptive management); Sidney A. Shapiro &
Robert L. Glicksman, The Missing Perspective, ENVTL. F., Mar.–Apr. 2003, at
42, 42 (“Instead of the increased ‘front end’ examination of regulations, such as
cost-benefits analysis, that is pushed by the critics—and is causing stagnation
of rulemaking—a pragmatic approach would look at a regulation’s actual ‘back
end’ effects after promulgation and make incremental adjustments as
needed.”).
53. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(3)–(4) (2009). The agency defines cumulative effects as “those effects of future State or private activities, not involving Federal activities, that are reasonably certain to occur within the action area.” Id.
§ 402.02.
54. See id. § 402.16.

438

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:424

As shown above, adaptive management in theory employs
a much more complicated, multistep approach, which values
the honing of predictive models and outcomes more than the
fairness of the process.55 Adaptive management theory regards
decisionmaking as more of a series of fine-tuning steps that are
continually and perpetually reevaluated.56 The legal view of a
resource management plan is that it comprehensively evaluates all rational considerations at once and then flips a toggle
switch; the adaptive management approach twiddles the dial as
information trickles in.
Adaptive management squares up much better with the
needs of many contemporary resource management problems.57
The comprehensive, front-end assessment methods of conventional resource management will likely face significant challenges in addressing problems such as climate change. The impacts of climate change necessitating human and
environmental adaptation are excruciatingly difficult to predict.58 Nonlinearities in change dynamics, environmental feedback properties, and the interactions of social and ecological
responses will soon exceed the boundaries of knowledge and
experience that have allowed environmental impact assessment
and cost-benefit analysis to maintain what reliability and credibility they have.59 Indeed, even before climate change adapta55. See supra text accompanying notes 12–17.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 12–17.
57. See supra Part I.A (discussing how ever-changing ecosystems require
management policies that can adapt to new and uncertain climate conditions).
58. Many ecologists believe we face a “no-analog” future—one for which
we have no experience on which to base projections of ecosystem change, and for
which models designed to allow active management decisions as climate
change takes effect are presently rudimentary and imprecise. See Peter Cox &
David Stephenson, A Changing Climate for Prediction, 317 SCIENCE 207, 207
(2007); Matthew C. Fitzpatrick & William W. Hargrove, The Projection of Species Distribution Models and the Problem of Non-Analog Climate, 18
BIODIVERSITY & CONSERVATION 2255, 2255 (2009); Douglas Fox, Back to the
No-Analog Future?, 316 SCIENCE 823, 823 (2007); Douglas Fox, When Worlds
Collide, CONSERVATION, Jan.–Mar. 2007, at 28, 31.
59. The scientific literature exploring these complex dynamics and exposing our lack of understanding about what lies ahead as temperature rises is
legion. See, e.g., U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, THRESHOLDS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE IN ECOSYSTEMS 74 –84 (2009), available at http://downloads
.climatescience.gov/sap/sap4 -2/sap4 -2-final-report-all.pdf (examining numerous positive feedback properties leading to nonlinear thresholds in climate
change dynamics); Almut Arneth et al., Clean the Air, Heat the Planet?, 326
SCIENCE 672, 672–73 (2009) (examining the feedback effects between conventional air pollution control and climate change mitigation, and concluding that
complex positive and negative feedback links exist and that, on balance, the
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tion became a pressing need, the challenges of front-end environmental impact assessment were evident in ecological contexts that were increasingly understood to be exceedingly complex.60
For example, a 1997 guide on considering cumulative effects under NEPA explains that “[d]etermining the cumulative
environmental consequences of an action requires delineating
the cause-and-effect relationships between the multiple actions
and the resources, ecosystems, and human communities of concern. Analysts must tease from the complex networks of possible interactions those that substantially affect the resources.”61
The guide advises analysts to “gather information about the
cause-and-effect relationships between stresses and resources”
and to develop “a conceptual model of cause and effect
. . . [with] [n]etwork[] and system diagrams [as] the preferred
methods of conceptualizing cause-and-effect relationships.”62
Adaptive management seems more in tune with this approach
than does conventional front-end decisionmaking.
The problem with adaptive management is that courts are
better equipped to review toggle switching than dial twid-

evidence and models suggest that “air pollution control will accelerate warming in the coming decades”); Gordon B. Bonan, Forests and Climate Change:
Forcings, Feedbacks, and the Climate Benefits of Forests, 320 SCIENCE 1444,
1444 (2008) (“[C]omplex and nonlinear forest-atmosphere interactions can
dampen or amplify anthropogenic climate change.”); I. Eisenman & J.S. Wettlaufer, Nonlinear Threshold Behavior During the Loss of Arctic Sea Ice, 106
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIENCE 28, 28 (2009) (describing the nonlinear “tipping
points” in the ice-albedo feedback effect); Jerome Gaillardet & Albert Galy,
Himalaya—Carbon Sink or Source?, 320 SCIENCE 1727, 1727–28 (2008) (explaining the uncertainties of the sinks and sources of the carbon geological
cycle); Steven W. Running, Ecosystem Disturbance, Carbon, and Climate, 321
SCIENCE 652, 652–53 (2008) (explaining the uncertainties of ecological sinks
and sources and how they might be impacted by episodic disturbances such as
fires and insect epidemics).
60. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145
(2003) (discussing environmental complexity theory, which suggests that environmental events do not follow typical statistical distributions and are, thus,
extremely difficult to plan for or predict); J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean up the Environment by
Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933 (1997) (explaining how the subject matter of environmental law consists of “interlinked complex adaptive systems,” the existence of which pose unique problems in terms
of environmental management and regulation).
61. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, CONSIDERING CUMULATIVE EFFECTS
UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, at vi (1997).
62. Id. at 38.
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dling.63 As the previous section demonstrated, agency policies
for implementing adaptive management arose in a statutory
vacuum and are themselves largely devoid of legal details.64
While judges might generally understand the rationale for
adaptive management and worry about discouraging experimentation that will lead to better conservation outcomes, the
absence of clear statutory authority and well-defined regulatory
standards will likely make evaluating agency adaptive management plans a struggle.65 There are no statutory standards
for oversight, no concrete legal definitions for determining what
qualifies as adaptive management, and few binding steps in
adopting adaptive management.66 In rejecting “cookbooks” for
adaptive management, agencies have failed to fill in the gaps
left by statutes that either predate, ignore, or simply mention
adaptive management in passing.67 Agency policies support
adaptive management as “learning while doing,” but courts are
bound to review agency behavior in accordance with laws premised on a different paradigm. Part II of this Article reviews the
court decisions relating to this disparity between agency policies and traditional administrative law and describes how
judges attempt to reconcile it.
2. Adaptive Management: Theory Versus Practice
If one disparity in judicial interpretation arises from the
disconnect between adaptive management and conventional
administrative law, the second key disparity arises from the
gap between the theory of adaptive management as explored in
the scholarly literature and the practice as manifest in the actual plans agencies label as “adaptive management.” The
“learning while doing” policy approach to adaptive management, although formless in substance, could have accommodated agencies’ implementation of adaptive management by
adopting plans that fulfill the theory of adaptive management.
But the fiscal realities of natural resources management in the
field demand bare-bones approaches to project planning and
63. See infra Part II (discussing how courts have analyzed the legality of
adaptive management).
64. See supra Part I.B (describing how adaptive management lacks a concrete definition or framework of statutory guidance and, thus, is difficult to
implement in practice).
65. See supra Part I.B.
66. See supra Part I.B.
67. See supra Part I.B.
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conservation.68 In this lean environment, the incentives for
field-level resource managers are to get the doing done through
triage and to save the learning for better times.
Indeed, as the agency policies discussed above and the cases explored in Part II illustrate, agencies in practice have employed what we call “a/m-lite,” a stripped-down version of adaptive management that almost always neglects to develop
testable hypotheses as the basis for management actions.69 Often a/m-lite fails even to structure a learning procedure,
whether through experimentation, historical research, or modeling.70 Furthermore, lack of follow-through plagues implementation. As the cases show, there are other dimensions to the
agency plans that depart from adaptive management theory
because of limited funding.71 This a/m-lite approach, in its most
extreme form, is open-ended contingency planning or “on-thefly” management that promises some loosely described response to whatever circumstances arise. Some a/m-lite implementation can fairly be considered a passive form of adaptive
management, suitable to circumstances where the range of
possible variations in actions and outcomes are small.72 But
a/m-lite may also slip into “basic trial and error learning in
which explicit hypotheses are absent or vague,” or there may be

68. See Robert L. Fischman, Predictions and Prescriptions for the Endangered Species Act, 34 ENVTL. L. 451, 471–75 (2004) (explaining how many environmental laws do not allocate the funds necessary to operate at optimum
levels); see also OUTDOOR RES. REVIEW GRP., GREAT OUTDOORS AMERICA 4
(2009), available at http://www.orrgroup.org/documents/July2009_Great-Outdoors
-America-report.pdf (finding appropriations to be “woefully inadequate to meet
identified needs for land and water conservation and outdoor recreation”);
Caitlin A. Burke et al., Policy News: Natural Resource Agency Funding, 32
WILDLIFE SOC’Y BULL. 260, 262 (2004) (“Working to achieve enhanced funding
and sound policies for wildlife conservation has always been important for wildlife professionals, but now—in this time of budget shortfalls—it is essential.”).
69. See Doremus, supra note 1, at 562 (“The potential for learning has too
often been ignored in environmental regulation and natural resource management.”).
70. See id.
71. See, e.g., S. Fork Band Council v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 588 F.3d
718, 725–26 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (describing a hastily prepared EIS
that the court held inadequate due to its lack of detail).
72. See R. Gregory et al., Deconstructing Adaptive Management: Criteria
for Applications to Environmental Management, 16 ECOLOGICAL
APPLICATIONS 2411, 2412 (2006) (distinguishing active adaptive management,
which hews closely to the theoretical model, from passive adaptive management, which retains some of the benefits of the theoretical approach while sacrificing some scientific rigor).
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a complete lack of monitoring and meaningful adjustments.73
At its worst, a/m-lite may be a pretext for postponing difficult,
but important, decisions in order to dodge the constraints of
budgets, politics, or scientific uncertainty.74
The difference between adaptive management, as practiced, and the adaptive management concept universally
praised as essential for dealing with the complexities of natural
systems does not illustrate a disagreement about how adaptive
management should work as much as it reveals the budgetary
and political limitations of agencies responsible for implementation.75 After all, we cannot expect agencies to carry out
projects for which they have no funding. Moreover, adaptive
management cannot dissolve the political conflicts that surround competition for scarce resources.76
Nonetheless, the gap between theory and practice raises an
important concern about bait and switch. Agencies base their
departure from the conventional, comprehensive rationality
model on the literature arguing that adaptive management is a
superior approach.77 But as the examples in Part II show, the
policies and rules agencies have adopted leave them plenty of
room to implement something different from the adaptive management approach supported by the management literature.
Our concern is whether the agency-implemented a/m-lite is
enough of an improvement over the comprehensive rationality
assumption of front-end decisionmaking to justify the loss of
certainty and transparency. This concern is particularly important because adaptive management is most often invoked as a
tool to handle decisionmaking in the face of uncertainty.78
Theoretical adaptive management reduces uncertainty over
time, as experiments yield insights about how ecosystems re-

73. Id.
74. See id. at 2411.
75. See id.
76. See Carol Hirschon Weiss, The Experimenting Society in a Political
World, in VALIDITY & SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION 283, 284 (Leonard Bickman
ed., 2000) (discussing the view that politics play an important role “in influencing how feasible . . . advocacy of experimental reform [can] be”).
77. See supra Part I.A (discussing the theories that have caused adaptive
management to become a popular modern approach to environmental regulation).
78. See supra Part I.A (describing how ever-changing ecosystems demand
management policies that can keep pace with changing conditions).

2010]

ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT

443

spond to various interventions.79 But a/m-lite, which typically
neglects hypothesis testing, does not help in this manner.80
Even when it does specify a hypothesis to test, management
practice often shortchanges evaluation. Part II of this Article
examines this disparity by analyzing cases that have engaged
the courts in disagreements about what constitutes legal adaptive management.
II. LITIGATION OVER ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT
In a relatively short time, the adaptive management label
for agency resource management plans has become ubiquitous.
Since 1993, each of the major federal resource management
agencies has made a policy commitment to employ adaptive
management.81 At one time, a casual reader of a draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) could predict which alternative an agency would likely prefer by identifying the one that
included “balanced approach” in its title.82 Over the past decade
the tip-off has become “adaptive.”83
79. See Doremus, supra note 1, at 549 (“[I]t is possible to reduce uncertainty over time in ways that are relevant to subsequent iterations or related
decisions.”).
80. See id. at 569 (discussing how adaptive management is often used as a
means to “muddle through” and act in the face of uncertainty “without any enforceable requirements for learning or incorporating new knowledge”).
81. Many of these are discussed infra in Part II.B. The Northwest Power
Planning Council was the most important early adopter when it employed
“adaptive management” in its 1982 Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program to address pervasive scientific uncertainty regarding salmon recovery.
See Nw. Res. Info. Ctr. v. Nw. Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371, 1380
(9th Cir. 1994). Adaptive management continues to be the organizing principle
for fish conservation in the Columbia Basin today. See NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN. ET AL., FCRPS ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN: 2008–2018 FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER
SYSTEM BIOLOGICAL OPINION (2009), available at http://www.salmonrecovery
.gov/Files/BiologicalOpinions/AMIP_09 10 09.pdf (purporting to strengthen the
agencies’ 2008 biological opinion—which the U.S. District Court in National
Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 524 F.3d 917 (9th
Cir. 2008), remanded for being structurally flawed under the ESA—by, inter
alia, establishing new biological triggers to activate short- and long-term responses, and providing a rapid response to any detected significant decline in
fish populations).
82. See, e.g., Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Singleton, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1182,
1195 (D. Or. 1998) (stating that the preferred alternative is one which articulates an intention to provide a “balanced approach” to protecting Oregon’s rivers); Am. Motorcyclist Ass’n v. Watt, 534 F. Supp. 923, 928 (C.D. Cal. 1981)
(demonstrating that the Bureau of Land Management takes a balanced approach to conservation planning).
83. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION: FINAL
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Therefore, it was inevitable that courts would be called
upon to evaluate how well the “adaptive” alternatives selected
by agencies meet legal requirements. Every year, more and
more published federal court decisions employ the term “adaptive management.” However, most cases using or even discussing the term “adaptive management” focus on issues peripheral
to the key disparities at the heart of this analysis. Because an
increasing majority of new federal resource management decisions use an adaptive management framework, a steady stream
of challenges to federal resource management decisions need to
discuss the framework to set the stage for evaluating the unrelated legal challenges.
A May 13, 2010, search of Westlaw and LexisNexis reported 120 federal court decisions containing the phrase “adaptive management.”84 That group can be distilled to sixty-nine
cases involving a challenge to adaptive management of the environment or natural resources.85 In most of those cases, courts
BISON AND ELK MANAGEMENT PLAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
4 (2007), available at http://www.fws.gov/bisonandelkplan/ROD.pdf [hereinafter
BISON AND ELK PLAN] (choosing the “Adaptively Manage Habitat and Populations” alternative). Increasingly, however, it can be difficult to find an alternative in a resource management EIS that does not purport to be adaptive. See,
e.g., Cal. Res. Agency v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. C 08-1185 MHP, 2009 WL
6006102, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2009) (rejecting a challenge to a forestplan EIS in which all alternatives employed adaptive management because
the Forest Service is not compelled to evaluate alternatives incompatible with
its “basic policy objectives” or its “fundamental policy choice”).
84. Our focus is on identifying and analyzing judicial decisions in which
the court directly evaluates the legality of an agency’s use of adaptive management to implement a regulatory program. We recognize that there are likely many pieces of litigation involving disputes over, among other things, an
agency’s use of adaptive management that does not produce a judicial opinion
directly assessing its legality. Some judicial opinions might also evaluate the
legality of a specific agency action designed to implement adaptive management without ever mentioning adaptive management as the agency’s fundamental guiding motivation; though our impression is that as much as agencies
advertise their purported use and implementation of adaptive management in
policy documents, they would be no less eager to do so in court filings. Identifying and analyzing cases in both of these categories of cases would be important to gain a complete understanding of how adaptive management has fared
in the judicial forum. The most important cases for our purposes, however, are
those in which a court speaks directly to the use and legality of adaptive management. The language of these judicial opinions most substantively forms the
jurisprudence of adaptive management.
85. The disparity between “decisions” and “cases” represents the fact that
thirteen disputes (i.e., cases) produced more than one court decision. E.g., Pac.
Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Gutierrez, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (E.D.
Cal. 2008). No single case produced more than one decision applying the law
directly to adaptive management.
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did not directly apply law to the adaptive aspect of the agency
action. Instead, the courts employed the term to describe the
action before getting to the legal issues dispositive to the case.86
Nonetheless, thirty-one federal court decisions do grapple
with the legality of adaptive management. The United States
lost more than half of these cases,87 a poor record given the deference accorded to agencies under administrative law.88 It is
these cases that reveal the most about the two key disparities
highlighted previously: (1) between the principles underlying
law and adaptive management, and (2) between adaptive management in theory and a/m-lite in practice. This study of the
first round of litigation emerging from the federal consensus
that natural resources agencies should practice adaptive management yields three key lessons about how those disparities
have worked out in the courts: (1) larger-scale plans are more
likely to incorporate successful adaptive management plans
than smaller ones;89 (2) the practice of tiering site-specific environmental impact analyses to an earlier, overarching, cumulative study is well suited to adaptive management, and adaptive
management can reduce the need for a supplemental EIS;90
and (3) adaptive management procedures, no matter how finely
crafted, cannot substitute for showing that a plan will meet the
substantive management criteria required by law.91
To set the stage for the analysis of these three themes,
three sweeping observations are in order. First, it is worth not86. See, e.g., Se. Conference v. Vilsack, 684 F. Supp. 2d 135, 139 (D.D.C.
2010) (mentioning that the plan in question employs adaptive management,
but recognizing that the disposition of the case actually turns on the definition
of “withdrawal” under 16 U.S.C. § 3213(a), rather than the legality of adaptive
management).
87. Not all of the government losses were due to problems with adaptive
management. For instance, the Ninth Circuit overturned the 2004 Sierra Forest Framework for NEPA violations while upholding its adaptive management
component. See infra notes 130–41 and accompanying text (discussing the
analysis of the 2004 Sierra Forest Framework and the legitimacy of adaptive
management techniques).
88. While the loss record for the United States is poor in these cases compared to administrative litigation overall, natural resource challenges generally fair better for plaintiffs in court than one would expect given the deferential
standard of review. See Denise M. Keele et al., Forest Service Land Management Litigation 1989–2002, 104 J. FORESTRY 196, 198 (2006) (discussing how,
of the 729 cases challenging Forest Service resource management decisions,
the agency won only 57.6 percent).
89. See infra Part II.A.
90. See infra Part II.B.
91. See infra Part II.C.
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ing that a court upholding an a/m-lite approach does not necessarily endorse the practice as advancing the goals of either law
or conservation policy. It simply means that the use of a/m-lite
did not run afoul of any specific legal requirement or substitute
for a required finding or procedure.92 While courts may approve
agency actions that involve terrible applications of adaptive
management, it is fair to say that the most vague and incomplete plans have a greater likelihood of remand.93
Second, many decisions applying the administrative law
standards of deference to agency expertise do not involve adaptive management, but are relevant to understanding how
courts regard it. For instance, the rigor with which an agency
should explore the effects of similarly situated actions before
committing to a new one is central to many natural resource
cases.94 The active learning component of adaptive management makes these cases relevant even if they did not review
plans that purported to apply adaptive management. Therefore, we bring to bear on the question of how courts apply law
to adaptive management cases beyond the relatively small
sample of decisions that have already evaluated specific challenges to adaptive management.95
Third, regardless of the particular outcome of judicial review, courts generally wish to support the trend toward adaptive management.96 They seem to understand that arguments
92. See, e.g., Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. C 04 04647 CRB, 2005 WL 3021939, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2005) (demonstrating
that the court did not pass judgment on the wisdom of an adaptive management approach, but still found that the approach satisfied NEPA planning requirements).
93. See, e.g., Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,
387 F.3d 989, 997 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a general discussion of an environmental problem across a large area did not satisfy NEPA).
94. See Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 991–92 (9th Cir. 2008)
(refusing to analyze whether the agency incorporated adaptive learning from
prior logging projects before beginning another, similar project); see also infra
note 243 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of the Lands
Council v. McNair case in greater depth).
95. E.g., S. Fork Band Council v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 588 F.3d 718
(9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (providing an example of how courts deal with resource management plans that are relatively vague and general in scope); see
also infra note 227 and accompanying text (discussing the problems of openended contingency planning).
96. See, e.g., Cal. Res. Agency v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. C 08-1185 MHP,
2009 WL 6006102, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2009) (accepting a limitation on
the range of alternatives considered in a national forest plan’s EIS to exclude
strategies other than adaptive management).
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in the conservation management literature all regard adaptive
management as the best-suited decisionmaking technique for
ecosystems.97 Indeed, at least one court has come close to requiring adaptive management in holding that ESA HCPs must
contain some provision to respond to unforeseen circumstances.98 Courts sometimes explicitly state that they do not
wish to create disincentives for using adaptive management.99
Even where adaptive management plans have run afoul of judicial review, courts are careful to state that only the particular
application in the case at hand is illegal, not adaptive management itself.100 It is fair to conclude from this litigation that
courts, despite their roots in the conventional administrative
law model of a phase change at the time of final agency action,
generally give agencies wide berth within statutory constraints
to alter traditional planning approaches to accommodate adaptive management.
A. BIGGER IS BETTER
Spatial and temporal scale is a critical component of adaptive management.101 Applying adaptive management through
larger area, longer time frame plans has tended to produce better outcomes for agencies in the courts.102 Though this may be
due to the larger budgets associated with developing (and to a
lesser extent, implementing) the plans, the primary advantage
97. See id.
98. Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bartel, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1144
(S.D. Cal. 2006); see also discussion infra note 215.
99. See, e.g., Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. C 04 04647 CRB, 2005 WL 3021939, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2005) (holding that
the agency’s implementation of an adaptive management plan does not constitute a “major federal action” under NEPA, therefore sparing it from the requirement of preparing a supplemental EIS and making the plan easier to put
into place).
100. For example, see Northwest Resources Information Center, Inc. v.
Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371, 1380 n.18 (9th Cir. 1994),
where the court described adaptive management as “scientifically sound,” but
rejected particular aspects of the government’s implementation of the plan.
101. See Robert L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conservation from Pollution Control Law: Cooperative Federalism for Recovery Under
the Endangered Species Act, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 45, 146–48 (2002) (summarizing the benefits of large-area plans).
102. See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1311
(W.D. Wash. 1994) (suggesting that compliance with environmental protection
statutes requires planning on a scale that considers the entire ecosystem),
aff’d sub nom. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401, 1404 –06 (9th
Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
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enjoyed by large-scale plans is slack.103 The larger the plan, the
more room there is for trade-offs between competing interests,
zones with different dominant uses (including control areas for
experiments), and flexibility for revising management guidelines to reflect lessons learned.104 Larger plans tend to employ a
version of adaptive management that comes closer to the model
in the scholarly literature than do smaller-scale plans.105 The
literature addressing how conservation can adapt to climate
change also highlights the greater utility of larger spatial and
temporal scale planning.106
The litigation over adaptive management discussed in the
remainder of Part II.B also reflects the advantages of the larger-scale plans. Four major adaptive management efforts constitute about half of the federal litigation grappling with the concept. With a few notable exceptions, discussed below, federal
agencies in these four areas have experienced success in persuading courts to defer to their management choices and adaptive plans. Two of the efforts deal with forest management: the
Northwest Forest Plan, covering 24.4 million acres in Washington and Oregon, and the Sierra Forest Framework, covering
11.5 million acres in California. The other two deal with water
infrastructure: management of the Sacramento-San Joaquin
River Delta (and its related infrastructure supplying water to
the Central Valley) and operation of the Missouri River works
controlled by the Army Corps.

103. See Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 101, at 147 (noting that largerscale plans are “more flexible because [they disperse] the burden of preservation
or restriction of development over a broad area to allow for more trade-offs”).
104. This mirrors the experience of habitat conservation planning under
the ESA. See id. at 147–48 (“Just as flexibility to trade off between habitat
conservation and degradation shrinks with the geographic size of the plan, it
also diminishes over time as a species becomes more imperiled.”). But see
Gregory et al., supra note 72, at 2423 (highlighting the problems of large-scale,
long-term experimental design, and noting the failures in applying adaptive
management to the Columbia River Basin and the Everglades).
105. See Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 101, at 147 (suggesting that
larger plans more closely follow adaptive management techniques because
they are more comprehensive, and less piecemeal, than smaller plans).
106. See, e.g., Brad Griffith et al., Climate Change Adaptation for the US
National Wildlife Refuge System, 44 ENVTL. MGMT. 1043, 1043 (2009) (noting
that “[g]eographic isolation and small unit size compound the challenges of
climate change,” which means that “strategic response requires system-wide
planning”).
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The Northwest Forest Plan (NWFP) is one of the earliest
large-scale adaptive management efforts,107 and one of the most
successful in attracting support from the courts for the adaptive management concept. Its age and scope make it the champion survivor of dozens of rounds of litigation. The NWFP resulted from a compromise brokered by President Clinton, who
played an unprecedented (and, to date, unemulated) personal
role in shaping the contours of the compromise it represented
between timber and environmental interests.108 The immense
plan is strikingly complex, but in general outline it consisted of
four elements: land allocation, aquatic conservation strategy,
survey and monitoring requirements, and adaptive management.109
The goal of the NWFP, originally completed in 1994, is to
allow for substantial timber harvesting while maintaining the
forest characteristics that support viable populations of northern spotted owls, salmon runs that breed in forest streams, and
hundreds of other species sensitive to logging operations.110
Adaptive management plays a leading role in two aspects of the
plan: administration of lands specially designated for adaptive
management experimentation, and as a general principle for
implementation and revision of the overall set of management

107. The Northwest Power Planning Council was an agency that sought to
use adaptive management in a large-scale plan early on with the 1982 Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program. See Nw. Res. Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Nw. Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371, 1380–83 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing the implementation of the 1982 plan and subsequent adaptations).
108. See U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC. ET AL., RECORD OF DECISION FOR
AMENDMENTS TO FOREST SERVICE AND BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT
PLANNING DOCUMENTS WITHIN THE RANGE OF THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL
1 (1994) [hereinafter ROD NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL], available at http://www
.reo.gov/library/reports/newroda.pdf (identifying the conference held by President Clinton as a catalyst for the NWFP); STEVEN L. YAFFEE, THE WISDOM OF
THE SPOTTED OWL 141–43 (1994) (describing the conference and its surrounding circumstances).
109. Both a Record of Decision and an EIS were based on FOREST
ECOSYSTEM MGMT. ASSESSMENT TEAM, FOREST ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT:
AN ECOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL ASSESSMENT, at II-3 to II-4 (1983)
[hereinafter FEMAT REPORT] (discussing the general approach of the plan).
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ET AL., FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON MANAGEMENT OF HABITAT FOR
LATE-SUCCESSIONAL AND OLD-GROWTH FOREST RELATED SPECIES WITHIN
THE RANGE OF THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL (1994) (demonstrating that two
documents based on the FEMAT report were similarly complex and focused).
110. See FEMAT REPORT, supra note 109, at II-1 to II-2 (outlining numerous goals of the FEMAT Report).
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prescriptions for the NWFP.111 As we later discuss, it is this
second aspect of adaptive management in the NWFP that has
generated litigation.
The land-allocation zones fall into three categories.112 Some
seventy-eight percent of the lands covered by the NWFP are
designated late-successional reserves, where maintaining and
encouraging the development of old-growth forests is the primary aim.113 Some logging consistent with this aim, such as
thinning to promote or enhance old-growth attributes, occurs in
this category.114 Most of the timber output, however, comes
from the second category, the matrix lands between the reserves. The third category designates ten zones ranging from
84,000 to 400,000 acres to serve as “adaptive management
areas,” where experiments with adaptive management would
be the primary purpose.115 Though the track record of the adaptive management areas does offer some general lessons for improving adaptive management generally, the unique mandate
limits their application.116 The true test of NWFP adaptive
management is its success in guiding the vast majority of lands
designated matrix or reserve, where balancing timber production against environmental values generated—and continues to
generate—enormous controversy.117 It is the lands not specifi111. See id. at II-4 (discussing the development of long-term management
alternatives); id. at II-11 to II-12 (identifying adaptive management areas as
places used to test and develop management approaches).
112. The Record of Decision actually identifies seven different types of land
allocations, but those allocations fit into categories of reserves, land allowing
for timber output, and land for adaptive management. See ROD NORTHERN
SPOTTED OWL, supra note 108, at 6–7.
113. See id. at 29.
114. See id. at 62–63 (discussing the importance of thinning).
115. FEMAT REPORT, supra note 109, at III-24, III-30 to III-33 (identifying
the regions to be used as adaptive management areas).
116. For discussions on the track record of adaptive management areas, see
generally, GEORGE H. STANKEY & BRUCE SHINDLER, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT
AREAS: ACHIEVING THE PROMISE, AVOIDING THE PERIL (1997), available at
ftp://ftp.blm.gov/pub/blmlibrary/BLMpublications/AdaptiveManagement/Adaptive
MgmtTechGuide/CDReferences/Stankey_1997_Adaptive%20Management%20
Areas%20-%20Achieving%20the%20Promi.pdf; Andrew N. Gray, Adaptive Ecosystem Management in the Pacific Northwest: A Case Study from Coastal Oregon, CONSERVATION ECOLOGY (Nov. 23, 2000), http://www.ecologyandsociety
.org/vol4/iss2/art6/; Forest Fleischman, Bureaucracy, Collaboration and Coproduction: A Case Study of the Implementation of Adaptive Management in
the U.S.D.A. Forest Service (Apr. 15, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/publications/materials/conference_
papers/fleischman.pdf .
117. The leading analysis of how well the NWFP modeled actual adaptive
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cally set aside for adaptive management experiments where the
NWFP experience most closely resembles routine federal conservation policy challenges.
The overarching NWFP mandate for adaptive management
through monitoring and evaluation involved multiple levels of
planning to restrict disturbance to riparian areas in an “aquatic
conservation strategy” (ACS) and “survey and manage” (S&M)
requirements for over 400 species, with some triggering population surveys before ground-disturbing activity, such as logging.
Courts rejected challenges to the original NWFP, including its
adaptive elements.118 Subsequently, the ACS and S&M provisions of the NWFP were common bases for judicial remands
overturning timber sales.119 Appropriations and political will
never fully supported implementation of these components of
adaptive management, but the framework for forest management remains a workable process for some projects.120 Still, the
adaptive management requirements and the degraded conditions of the forests in the NWFP resulted in far less logging
than promised.121

management is B.T. Bormann et al., Adaptive Management of Forest Ecosystems: Did Some Rubber Hit the Road?, 57 BIOSCIENCE 186, 186 (2007), who
explore “the concepts of adaptive management as they were developed [through
FEMAT] and applied on federal lands through the Northwest Forest Plan.”
118. E.g., Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1310–17
(W.D. Wash. 1994), aff’d sub nom. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d
1401, 1404 –06 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
119. See, e.g., Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 265 F.3d 1028, 1037–38 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasizing the ACS’s
short-term protections that work to ensure the habitat will support the migration cycles of salmon, while also finding that the long-term recovery of the
aquatic habitat may not be sufficient to comply with the NWFP); Or. Natural
Res. Council Action v. U.S. Forest Serv., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1093–94 (W.D.
Wash. 1999) (emphasizing the importance of S&M to the NWFP process because finding new populations of sensitive species before logging allows for the
placement of protections).
120. See K. Norman Johnson et al., Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team Assessments, in BIOREGIONAL ASSESSMENT: SCIENCE AT THE
CROSSROADS OF MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 85, 107–11 (K. Norman Johnson et
al. eds., 1999) (discussing measurements for success and support of adaptive
management in the NWFP). Nonetheless, new circumstances, including the
incursion of aggressive barred owls and climate change, have prompted the
Obama Administration to begin a revision of the recovery plan for the Northern Spotted Owl in the NWFP. See April Reese, New Threats Could Undermine Obama Administration’s Plan for Northern Spotted Owl, LAND LETTER
(Apr. 9, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/Landletter/print/2009/04/09/2.
121. See Johnson et al., supra note 120, at 107–09 (discussing the failure to
meet goals for forest outputs).
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In response to the underperformance of the NWFP in producing cut timber, the George W. Bush Administration adopted
amendments in 2004 that unsuccessfully attempted to relax
two key elements of adaptive management: the ACS and the
S&M rules.122 The issues with both actions are similar, but the
court more thoroughly explored the issues in the context of
S&M. A district court overturned the 2004 amendments to the
NWFP that removed the S&M requirement for insufficient environmental analysis in the EIS.123 The original 1994 EIS for
the NWFP justified the S&M standard as needed to gain information to ensure viability for a host of species, a core adaptive function.124 The court agreed with the government that it
could change its opinion about the best way to balance goals in
the NWFP, but it found that a change eliminating a fundamental standard of adaptive management requires thorough analysis and disclosure of the environmental consequences.125 In
other words, the adaptive framework of the NWFP depends on
certain fundamental monitoring tools, such as S&M, that cannot be reversed without revisiting the original charter and
analysis (in this case, the NWFP and its EIS). A similar effort
by the Bureau of Land Management to eliminate pre-logging
surveys for the red tree vole (prey for spotted owls) met the
same fate for failure to revise the underlying, large-scale adaptive management plans.126
The Sierra Forest Framework is smaller, younger, and subject to fewer lawsuits. Still, it offers a useful contrast with the
NWFP in the use of adaptive management to modify a multiforest management charter. In 2004 the Bush Administration
significantly amended California’s Sierra Forest Framework,
which governs administration of eleven national forests in the
Sierra Nevada Range.127 The changes shifted the “management
emphasis from biodiversity conservation and prescribed fire to

122. Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries
Serv., 482 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1251–53 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (overturning the
Bush administration’s ACS amendments); Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. Rey, 380
F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1197–98 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (overturning the Bush Administration’s S&M amendments).
123. Nw. Ecosystem Alliance, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 1192–93.
124. Id. at 1192.
125. Id. at 1193.
126. Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Boody, 468 F.3d 549, 560–61 (9th
Cir. 2006).
127. Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 577 F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 2009).
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aggressive mechanical thinning” and timber production.128 One
particularly contentious aspect of the 2004 framework expanded the number of trees that could be logged from those
twelve to twenty inches in diameter to those up to thirty inches
in diameter.129 Although the Ninth Circuit found the 2004
framework flawed because its environmental impact analysis
failed to consider a reasonable range of alternatives,130 a district court evaluating a challenge to the adaptive management
provisions endorsed the approach.131 The adaptive management
amendments were able to take advantage of the large scale of
the Framework to employ different “modules” in different areas
to comprise an “integrated research project.”132 This, along with
the use of modeling projections, is a principal reason why the
2004 Framework survived the allegation that the Forest Service deferred taking the required “hard look” at wildlife impacts
of more logging.133 Along with the NWFP, the 2004 Framework
is one of the only adaptive management plans considered by
courts that explicitly employed different management regimes
in different areas to create experiments testing hypotheses
about effects on forest fires and old-growth dependent species.
In upholding the adaptive management approach, the district
court fairly characterized the 2004 Framework as providing
“more flexibility to strategically locate treatments across the
landscape.”134 The large area covered by the Framework made
these elements of the plan easier to employ.
On the other hand, monitoring and mitigation modules do
not necessarily lead to learning that can or will be applied to
reshape projects. Indeed, the State of California complained
that the Forest Service had increased the logging intensity in
2004 without having applied data from the earlier, more conservative adaptive management approach in the 2001 framework.135 A federal district court recently upheld individual for128. Robert B. Keiter, Breaking Faith with Nature: The Bush Administration
and Public Land Policy, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 195, 231 (2007).
129. Sierra Forest Legacy, 577 F.3d at 1018, 1020.
130. Id. at 1021–22.
131. California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 2:05-cv-0211MCE-GGH, 2008 WL 3863479, at *16–17 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2008).
132. Id. at *19.
133. Id. at *4, *17–21.
134. Id. at *8.
135. State of California’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, California ex rel. Lockyer, 2008
WL 3863479 (No. 2:05-cv-0211-MCE-GGH).
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est plan amendments in the Sierra region against a challenge
that reduced monitoring of sensitive species created a foreseeable risk of degradation through the activities, such as logging,
authorized by the plans.136 The court wrote that “it presumes
too much to argue that [the previous, more detailed monitoring]
obligations would have turned up information that would have
inclined the Forest Service to significantly alter or modify a
particular project.”137 Though one can view the court’s decision
as skepticism about the value of the additional monitoring, it
also speaks to the absence of enforceable commitments in most
a/m-lite to revise projects in light of monitoring.138
It is also worth noting that big plans often enjoy special
appropriations associated with congressional support of adaptive experiments.139 In the case of the Sierra forests, the Herger-Feinstein Quincy Library Group Forest Recovery Act authorized specific funding for pilot projects.140 Combined with
the national priority to address fire risk and forest health, the
high-profile Framework was able to secure funds for monitoring and response of management experiments.141 This funding
is a rare, but reassuring, element of adaptive management
practice that ameliorated the loss of certainty in management
criteria occasioned by the 2004 amendments.
The most cited litigation endorsing the notion that adaptive management is compatible with NEPA and administrative
136. Sierra Forest Legacy v. U.S. Forest Serv., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1088–
91 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
137. Id. at 1090.
138. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate
Change: Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY
L.J. 1, 47–48 (2009) (describing the problems with adaptive management implementation for portions of the Colorado River that flows downstream of the
Glen Canyon Dam).
139. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 12, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-211, ch. 3, 108 Stat. 3,
16 (1994) (earmarking funding for the NWFP). The Northwest Forest Plan
program reported that it spent $50 million for monitoring. VALERIE RAPP,
NORTHWEST FOREST PLAN—THE FIRST 10 YEARS (1994 –2003), at 11 (2008).
140. Herger-Feinstein Quincy Library Group Forest Recovery Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-277, § 401, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-307 to -308 (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. § 2104 (1998)). Funding for the pilot projects totaled $25.3 million in
2008, more than three times the amount appropriated in 1999. U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC. ET AL., STATUS REPORT TO CONGRESS FISCAL YEAR 2008: HERGERFEINSTEIN QUINCY LIBRARY GROUP FOREST RECOVERY ACT PILOT PROJECT 4
(2009), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/r5/hfqlg/monitoring/report_to_congress/
2008/fy08_report_to_congress_letter.pdf.
141. California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 2:05-cv-0211MCE-GGH, 2008 WL 3863479, at *19 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2008).
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law concerns the Army Corps’ management of the Missouri
River, which it controls through dams. After the D.C. District
Court enjoined a river-operating plan for failing to comply with
the ESA,142 a series of cases beginning in 2004 have upheld the
Army Corps’ approach of employing adaptive management to
balance the needs of wildlife dependent on the natural seasonal
variation in flows (especially for the imperiled pallid sturgeon,
least tern, and piping plover) with the interests of flood control
and navigation.143 Though the courts did not grapple with the
adaptive management approach as deeply in this litigation as
in the other examples we discuss, its use on this scale by the
Army Corps is a significant step in the spread of comprehensive
adaptive management plans beyond the traditional public land
and wildlife agencies.
Probably the most complex of all the large-scale plans addresses the vast infrastructure diverting huge volumes of water
coming down the Sacramento River, around the delta it shares
with the San Joaquin River, and directing it to users further
south.144 The dams and diversions are operated jointly by state
and federal agencies, and the environmental issues include
wildlife, irrigation, flood risk, and potability of municipal water
supplies for tens of millions of people.145 The litigation challenging the adaptive management regimes pertaining to different species in the water system composes a mixed record.146 As
with the other examples discussed in this section, the large
area covered by the watersheds and the large volumes of water
certainly permit a wider array of trade-offs than can occur with

142. Am. Rivers v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 271 F. Supp. 2d 230, 253–58
(D.D.C. 2003) (finding mere mitigation measures inadequate to meet the ESA,
but launching a new biological opinion that triggered subsequent litigation in
the Eighth Circuit).
143. In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 516 F.3d 688, 690–94 (8th
Cir. 2008) (finding that an EIS was not necessary because adaptive management flexibility was provided for in an earlier Record of Decision); In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 421 F.3d 618, 635–36 (8th Cir. 2005) (allowing
for flow adjustment based on subsequent information and providing for a focus
on adaptive management).
144. See Cent. Delta Water Agency v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 653 F.
Supp. 2d 1066, 1073 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
145. See id. at 1073–74.
146. Compare Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Gutierrez, 606 F.
Supp. 2d 1122, 1193–94 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (upholding adaptive management
plan), with Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322,
387–88 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (finding that the adaptive management plan failed to
take into account sufficient information).
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smaller projects.147 But, in these Delta cases, the enormous
complexity of the statutes, contracts, and governing bodies
(both state and federal) likely undermined what would otherwise be a strong candidate for successful adaptive management. We will discuss how a single court approved one Delta
adaptive management plan but remanded another in Part II.C,
below, when we discuss the relationship between substantive
legal standards and the adaptive process.
B. NEPA: EFFECTIVE USE OF TIERING AND REDUCED NEED FOR
SUPPLEMENTS
The environmental impact analysis required by NEPA is
perhaps the grandest expression of the comprehensive rationality worldview rejected by adaptive management.148 So, it is
somewhat surprising to find in NEPA practice a tool well suited
to adaptive management: a/m-lite roots well in the soil of
NEPA tiering. Tiering, a practice dating to the 1970s, permits
agencies to proceed with broad programs without examining
site-specific effects.149 In situations such as the adoption of a
forest plan, or a regional methane leasing program, the agency
may defer the details of impact analysis until such time as it
proposes a timber sale150 or receives applications for permits to
drill.151 The first NEPA tier concentrates on cumulative impacts of anticipated successive activities without evaluating the
peculiar situations that may arise from any particular activity.152 Tiering relieves an agency from evaluating uncertain contingencies with tenuous connections to the overall impacts.153
147. See Natural Res. Def. Council, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 327–47 (discussing
the trade-offs that occur when assessing an adaptive management plan for the
Central Valley Project).
148. See generally Bryan D. Jones, Bounded Rationality, 2 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 297, 299 (1999) (describing comprehensive rationality).
149. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.20, 1508.28 (2009); Forty Most Asked Questions
Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed.
Reg. 18,026, 18,033 (Mar. 23, 1981) (describing in question 24(c) the function
of tiering).
150. See, e.g., Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,
387 F.3d 989, 992–93 (9th Cir. 2004).
151. See, e.g., Wilderness Soc’y v. Salazar, 603 F. Supp. 2d 52, 63–66
(D.D.C. 2009).
152. See Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. at 18,033.
153. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28 (“Tiering . . . helps the lead agency to focus on
the issues which are ripe for decision and exclude from consideration issues
already decided or not yet ripe.”).
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The subsequent levels of NEPA compliance occur as particular,
site-specific projects requiring approval.154 At that point, the
general discussions of the first tier may be incorporated by reference, and the EIS or EA will focus on just those issues specific to the particular activity.155 In fact, a subsequent EIS will often be unnecessary if a particular project creates only effects
already anticipated in the first tier EIS.156 For site-specific
projects, agencies commonly prepare environmental assessments concluding in findings of no significant impacts (FONSIs) that go beyond those adumbrated by the original program’s
EIS.157
Large-scale adaptive management generally involves a
massive EIS intended to serve as an overarching analysis to
which subsequent projects and adjustments may be tiered.158
This is how the adaptive charter works to guide subsequent
projects for the NWFP,159 and the national forests in the Sierra
Nevada Range.160 Indeed, the adaptive elements of the EISs
may even reduce the need for a subsequent supplemental EIS.
In Oregon Natural Resources Council Action v. United States
Forest Service,161 a court remanded a timber sale because it did
not include the S&M required by the NWFP.162 The NWFP
created binding law that the court ordered the agency to follow
or amend.163 However, the court rejected a NEPA claim that
the United States needed to prepare a supplemental EIS to
consider a variety of new information about forests, wildlife
and, water quality that had emerged since the adoption of the
NWFP.164 The court rebuffed the claim by relying, in part, on

154. See id. § 1502.20.
155. See id. § 1508.28.
156. See id.
157. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and
Managing Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903,
909–10 (2002) (explaining that a vast majority of environmental assessments
result in a FONSI).
158. See Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,033 (Mar. 23, 1981).
159. See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401, 1403–04
(9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (noting the overarching EIS process).
160. See, e.g., California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 2:05-cv0211-MCE-GGH, 2008 WL 3863479, at *1–3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2008).
161. 59 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
162. See id. at 1091–94.
163. Id. at 1093.
164. Id. at 1096.
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the adaptive management strategy in the NWFP.165 The court
determined that adaptive management anticipated that new
information would emerge and provided mechanisms for adjustment.166 This is an example of how the flexibility of adaptive management can ease the burden for an agency needing to
comply with NEPA over the course of a very long-term project,
such as restoring late-successional forests. A different judge in
the same court later reached the same result in a challenge to a
different timber sale after subsequent developments raised
doubts about the NWFP’s assumptions concerning logging on
private land.167 Again, the court relied on the adaptive management component of the NWFP to establish an assumption
that no supplemental study would be needed absent a showing
that the information could not be addressed by the adaptive
process.168
On the other hand, a subsequent decision justified as adaptive modification may go too far in changing the terms of the
original framework in the first tier. In that case, courts require
a supplemental EIS. In Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Center v.
Boody,169 the Ninth Circuit enjoined timber sales in part because a change in the survey requirements for the red tree vole
went too far beyond what the tier one NWFP EIS anticipated,
even with adaptive management.170 The federal government
had argued that the decision to change the vole’s S&M designation was within the adaptive latitude created by the NWFP.171
The court examined the NWFP EIS and disagreed.172 The lesson from Klamath Siskiyou is that an agency cannot tier when
revising a fundamental standard of an overarching adaptive
management plan.173
Another risk posed by the attraction of tiering is that an
agency will defer making controversial decisions on the basis
that it can work out the details of a fairly vague commitment to

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See Hanson v. U.S. Forest Serv., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1301–04 (W.D.
Wash. 2001).
168. Id. at 1304.
169. 468 F.3d 549 (9th Cir. 2006).
170. Id. at 561.
171. Id. at 560.
172. Id.
173. See id.
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goals in subsequent tiers.174 Unfortunately, the agency may be
setting itself up for failure if it is unable to secure the resources
to adequately tackle the difficult analysis in subsequent tiers.
Also, vague commitments that do not include site-specific criteria may simply allow political momentum to overwhelm the
plan’s objective. In the EIS supporting the elk and bison management plan for the National Elk Refuge and nearby lands,
the agency defined the (ultimately selected) “adaptive management” alternative as a plan implemented through a “structured framework . . . of adaptive management criteria and actions for transitioning from intensive supplemental winter
feeding.”175 However, the plan neither describes the “structured
framework” nor defines the “criteria.” Given the strong local political support for maintaining supplemental winter feeding,
opponents are understandably skeptical that such a vague
commitment will result in a transition to more natural winter
ranging behavior and lower elk populations.176 The goal of the
“adaptive management” alternative is to reduce the winter elk
population of the region by nearly twenty percent,177 but the
path to achieve it is not evident in the plan. Deferring a firm
decision to take a critical action, such as terminating winter
feeding until a subsequent incremental adaptive process, may
be a recipe for failure.178 Yet adaptive management and tiering
can make it easier for agencies to yield to the temptation to

174. Cf. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20 (2009) (discussing the “broader statement”
created in the first tier).
175. BISON AND ELK PLAN, supra note 83, at 65.
176. See Robert L. Fischman & Angela M. King, Savings Clauses and
Trends in Natural Resources Federalism, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
REV. 129, 137–41 (2007). Defenders of Wildlife and other environmental
groups have challenged the plan for these and other reasons. Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 37–43, Defenders of Wildlife v. Kempthorne, 698 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 08-CV-00945).
177. See BISON AND ELK PLAN, supra note 83, at 3, 19 (proposing a reduction in elk numbers from 13,000 to 11,000).
178. See Mary O’Brien, Uneasy Riders: A Citizen, a Cow, and NEPA, 39
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,632, at 10,633 (2009) (describing environmental impact
analysis for Forest Service allotment management plans that respond to degraded conditions with “vague commitments to future adaptive management”
without “clear triggers for applying the unspecified adaptive management
measures”). Another example of deferring difficult decisions through adaptive
management is the decision to adopt grazing allotments in the Sawtooth National Forest. See W. Watersheds Project v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. CV 05 189 E
BLW, 2006 WL 292010, at *2 (D. Idaho Feb. 7, 2006) (stating that the adaptive management strategy “did not define the protocols it would use or describe the monitoring that is the heart of the strategy”).
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dodge difficult, controversial decisions.179 It is not surprising,
then, that courts frequently reject adaptive management plans
as too amorphous.180 Professor Glicksman has characterized
some of this litigation as standing for the principle that agencies may not rely “on adaptive management as an excuse for deferring real planning in favor of” an approach that promises to
deal with expected future problems as they arise.181
Even if not amorphous, a promise to adaptively manage
problems may not fulfill the NEPA requirement that agencies
take a “hard look” at the impacts of their action. For instance,
High Sierra Hikers Association v. Weingardt182 overturned a
Forest Service decision to liberalize the rules limiting campfires
in high country parts of a wilderness area.183 Despite a record
raising a number of problems with the decision, including disparate treatment of commercial-pack trips compared to private
backpacking, physical impacts from fires and their residues,
and potential introduction of exotic seeds and pathogens
through packed wood, the Forest Service went forward with the
looser rules on the basis that it could monitor and adjust in response to problems.184 The court ruled that the agency could
not rely on adaptive management to overcome an inadequate
response to the problems raised in the record.185
On the other hand, Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership v. Salazar (TRCP)186 rebuffed a claim that an adaptive
management approach to handling site-specific and uncertain
impacts violated the NEPA’s requirement to evaluate environ-

179. See Beth C. Bryant, NEPA Compliance in Fisheries Management: The
Programmatic Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement on Alaskan
Groundfish Fisheries and Implication for NEPA Reform, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 441, 450 (2006).
180. See, e.g., Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Kempthorne, 577 F. Supp. 2d
183, 209–10 (D.D.C. 2008); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F.
Supp. 2d 322, 387 (E.D. Cal. 2007); Mountaineers v. U.S. Forest Serv., 445 F.
Supp. 2d 1235, 1250 (W.D. Wash. 2006); Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 457 F. Supp. 2d 198, 234 –35 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). But see Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 698 F. Supp. 2d 141, 149–50 (D.D.C. 2010)
(upholding the National Elk Refuge’s elk management plan despite its
amorphous adaptive management approach to reducing winter elk populations), appeal docketed, No. 08-cv-00945 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 26, 2010).
181. Glicksman, supra note 4, at 871.
182. 521 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
183. Id. at 1090–91.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1091.
186. No. 09-5162, 2010 WL 2869778 (D.C. Cir. July 23, 2010).
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mental effects before an agency undertakes an action.187 In contrast to High Sierra Hikers Association, which involved sitespecific environmental analyses for each special use permittee
and lifted an outright ban on campfires above specified elevations,188 TRCP reviewed a broad plan (covering more than
270,000 acres in the Atlantic Rim of Wyoming) for natural gas
development that did not yet authorize a specific grounddisturbing activity.189 The TRCP court refused to read the
NEPA regulations to require detailed commitments to mitigation for “long-term” plans.190 Specific activities are subject to
subsequent evaluations, tiered to the plan, and “exact application of mitigation measures will be determined on a site-specific
basis.”191 Once again, tiering helped rescue a/m-lite.
Though adaptive management, in and of itself, does not
trigger an EIS,192 adaptive management is not an alternative to
NEPA.193 A district court relied (in part) on NEPA itself to reject a 2005 rule substituting adaptive management for preparing EISs in developing national forest plans.194 The court found
that the administrative record failed to support a judgment
that substituting adaptive management would result in no significant environmental outcomes.195
C. PROCEDURES FOR ADAPTATION CANNOT SUBSTITUTE FOR
SHOWING COMPLIANCE WITH SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS
Another temptation of adaptive management is to lavish
attention on the iterative process at the expense of addressing
the substantive management criteria required by law.196 Courts
are particularly attentive to substantive management criteria

187. Id. at *14 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (b)).
188. High Sierra Hikers Ass’n, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 1072, 1090.
189. Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship, 2010 WL 2869778, at *3–4.
190. Id. at *16.
191. Id. at *15.
192. See Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. C 04 04647 CRB, 2005 WL 3021939, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2005).
193. See Julie Thrower, Adaptive Management and NEPA: How a Nonequilibrium View of Ecosystems Mandates Flexible Regulation, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q.
871, 894 (2006).
194. Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 481 F. Supp. 2d
1059, 1086–87 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
195. Id. at 1089–90.
196. See Wiersema, supra note 4, at 1256 (arguing that adaptive management by agencies pays insufficient attention to substantive goals).
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in statutes, such as the “no jeopardy” standard in the ESA,197
and regulations, such as the “viability” standard for animal
populations in national forests.198 Since the 1970s, courts have
required agencies to develop records showing how they will
meet substantive standards.199 The first round of litigation over
adaptive management reveals that courts are holding firm to
this principle. Promises to plan, collaborate, or manage toward
compliance should environmental conditions degrade below the
substantive management criterion are insufficient to survive
judicial review.200
197. The “no jeopardy” standard explains that each federal agency must
ensure that its actions “are not likely to jeopardize” any endangered species or
habitats. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006). Courts are often attentive to the “no
jeopardy” standard. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife,
551 U.S. 644, 669 (2007) (“[N]o-jeopardy duty covers only discretionary agency
actions and does not attach to actions (like the NPDES permitting transfer
authorization) that an agency is required by statute to undertake once certain
specified triggering events have occurred.”); Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S.
Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Because the ESA
does not prescribe how the jeopardy prong is to be determined, nor how species
populations are to be estimated, we hold that it is a permissible interpretation
of the statute to rest the jeopardy analysis on a habitat proxy.”); Pac. Coast
Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Gutierrez, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1167 (E.D.
Cal. 2008) (“[A] jeopardy regulation . . . requires . . . agencies to consider both
recovery and survival impacts on listed species.” (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v.
Nat’l Marines Fisheries Serv., 481 F.3d 1224, 1237 (9th Cir. 2007))).
198. The “viability standard” is embodied in 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (2000) (“In
order to insure that viable populations [of fish and wildlife] will be maintained, habitat must be provided to support, at least, a minimum number of
reproductive individuals and that habitat must be well distributed so that
those individuals can interact with others in the planning area.”). Although
formally revoked by National Forest System Land and Resource Management
Planning, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,514 (Nov. 9, 2000), that replaced it with a less specific “sustainability” standard, the “viability” standard remained in place for
forest planning through most of the Bush Administration. See, e.g., Native
Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1237 n.5 (9th Cir.
2005) (“[A]pplication of these [new] regulations was delayed . . . . As a result,
the regulations relevant [in the case at bar] are found in the July 1, 2000 Code
of Federal Regulations.”).
199. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
419 (1971) (affirming the Administrative Procedure Act’s, 5 U.S.C. § 706
(2006), requirement that courts review agency decisions based on the agency’s
“whole record”).
200. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d
322, 387 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (“Adaptive management is within the agency’s discretion to choose and employ, however, the absence of any definite, certain, or
enforceable criteria or standards make its use arbitrary and capricious under
the totality of the circumstances.”); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1078, (D. Or. 2001) (explaining that the Army
Corps’ adaptive management approach provided the court with insufficient
information to rule on summary judgment); Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903
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The ESA is a prevalent vehicle for placing substantive
management criteria on otherwise discretionary management
of public lands and waters. The listing of a species often triggers new restrictions on longstanding management regimes,
such as water allocations (for example in California’s Sacramento Delta)201 or timber harvests (for example in the Pacific
Northwest).202 The ESA, therefore, often drives adaptive management plans to substitute for older ways of using public resources. Once a management issue triggers ESA compliance,
the biological opinion of the Fish & Wildlife or Fisheries Service
will essentially establish the boundaries for permissible management options.203 The biological opinions determine which
actions will cross the line into jeopardizing the continued existence of a species, and what measures will be required to protect an agency from liability under the ESA. The litigation reveals that it is these biological opinions that often prompt
agency adaptive management.204
F. Supp. 2d 96, 113 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding that a FWS management plan for
grizzly bears, which included adaptive management among other schemes, did
not meet ESA requirements because “[d]efendants have not met their burden to
develop objective, measurable criteria by which to assess present or threatened
destruction, modification or curtailment of the grizzly bear’s habitat or
range”). But cf. Or. Natural Res. Council Action v. U.S. Forest Serv., 59 F. Supp.
2d 1085, 1096 (W.D. Wash 1999) (“The plan’s adaptive management approach
is adequate to deal with any new information plaintiffs have identified.”).
201. Cent. Delta Water Agency v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 653 F. Supp.
2d 1066, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (describing the effects of the decision to list
smelt on the water management plan).
202. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1996)
(per curiam) (noting the effect of listing the spotted owl on the existing forest
management plan). See generally YAFFEE, supra note 108 (describing the history of the listing decision for the spotted owl and its ramifications with respect to politics and environmental regulations).
203. This is particularly true after the action agency has adopted the conditions of the biological opinion. See Delta Smelt Consol. Cases, 686 F. Supp. 2d
1026, 1043–44 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“The adaptive management protocol prescribed . . . leaves FWS with the final word on exactly what flow requirements
will be imposed.”).
204. See, e.g., In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 421 F.3d 618,
626 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The 2000 BiOp RPA also mandated habitat restoration, a
comprehensive species and habitat monitoring program, and an adaptive
management framework.”); Consol. Salmonid Cases, 688 F. Supp. 2d 1013,
1025 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“[In the] 2008 Smelt BiOp . . . the adaptive management protocol [was] prescribed in the RPA.”); Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s
Ass’ns v. Gutierrez, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1128 (E.D. Cal 2008) (“The BiOp
was intended to address the potential adverse impacts of ongoing (for the next
twenty-five years) CVP and SWP operations on the salmonid species.”); id. at
1184 –85 (discussing the biological opinion’s impact on adaptive management).
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A pair of decisions by U.S. District Court Judge Oliver
Wanger in the Eastern District of California provides a particularly illuminating contrast in the relationship between adaptive management and substantive legal standards.205 Both cases concerned challenges to adaptive management plans for opoperating the vast water infrastructure that moves water
through and around the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta
in California. The listing of the Delta smelt by the FWS and
salmonid species by the Fisheries Service triggered two different biological opinions in order to fulfill the legal duty not to
jeopardize the continued existence of the fishes under the ESA.
The water project consulted separately with the two services.
This gave rise to two sets of adaptive management plans (one
for the smelt and one for the salmonids) that generated two different lawsuits.
Both plans employed adaptive management, but Judge
Wanger upheld one and remanded the other under the usual
judicial standard that an agency must provide “reasonable certainty” that it will meet a statutory requirement.206 The explanation for these disparate results hinges on whether the adaptive management framework offered more than mere process.
The salmonid adaptive management protocol, approved by
Judge Wanger, contained definite, substantive criteria that
served as triggers for reinitiating ESA consultation to revise
management.207 Also, the Fisheries Service’s biological opinion
imposed “enforceable definite and certain requirements” on the
operation of the water works.208 In contrast, the smelt adaptive
management protocol failed to provide enforceable, precise criteria to bind operators of the system.209 The adaptive manage205. Compare Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, 606 F. Supp. 2d at
1194 (remanding the case, but upholding the adaptive management plan),
with Natural Res. Def. Council, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 387 (remanding the adaptive management plan).
206. See Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 1184;
Natural Res. Def. Council, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 353.
207. Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 1186 (establishing a temperature trigger of fifty-six degrees to reinitiate consultation).
Judge Wanger subsequently remanded a later salmonid biological opinion for
an arbitrary and capricious formulation of water flow restrictions. See Consol.
Salmonid Cases, No. 1:09-cv-01053-OWW-DLB, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 18, 2010)
(Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Plaintiffs’ Request for Preliminary Injunction), available at http://www.endangeredspecieslawandpolicy.com/
uploads/file/Salmon%20PI.pdf.
208. Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 1185 (imposing mandatory terms and conditions as part of an incidental take statement).
209. Id. (comparing cases).
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ment protocol for the smelt did not bind the operators, but it
was procedurally elaborate. It involved a complex “risk assessment matrix” containing criteria that, if met, would trigger a
working group to meet.210 The group would then “consider” a
range of management changes.211 While the process itself was
mandatory, the court faulted the protocol for failing to assure
that the result of the process would be some kind of action taken to secure the continued existence of the smelt.212 Judge
Wanger did not assert that the agency meant to disregard its
statutory responsibilities, just that the record of decision failed
to ensure that they would be met.213
In overturning the smelt adaptive management protocol,
the court contrasted another ESA case addressing a large-scale
HCP that would allow land development in the Natomas Basin
of the Sacramento area to proceed notwithstanding harms to
listed species.214 The Natomas Basin HCP employed adaptive
management to deal with the uncertainty of where and when
development would occur (as well as how effective mitigation
measures would conserve the effected species).215 Judge Wanger distinguished the adaptive adjustment in the Natomas Basin
plan as “employ[ing] well-defined mitigation measures” such as
conservation land purchases, adjustment of conservation re-

210. Natural Res. Def. Council, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 341.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 352.
213. See id. at 354.
214. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Babbitt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (E.D. Cal. 2000)
(endorsing the adaptive management elements of the HCP/incidental take
permit while overturning it on a variety of other grounds related to the misfit
between the scale of the plan and the governance/commitment of the program).
215. A subsequent case overturning a HCP found that long-term take permits under the ESA require some procedure to deal with unforeseen circumstances. See Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bartel, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1118,
1145 (S.D. Cal. 2006). The court relied, in part, on National Wildlife Federation to show that adaptive management may fulfill that necessary role. See id.
at 1144. The origin of the requirement to address unforeseen circumstances is
in the original HCP dealing with development of San Bruno Mountain, which
the House Conference Report endorsed with legislation that ultimately authorized incidental take permits. See ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AMENDMENTS OF
1982, H.R. REP. NO. 97-835, at 31–32 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2860, 2872–73. Courts now routinely approve HCPs that rely on adaptive
management. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 202 F. Supp. 2d 594, 598 (W.D. Tex. 2002) (upholding a conservation
plan, which included adaptive management, because it was “negotiated and
regulated vigorously” by the FWS).
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serve size, and modification of agricultural practices.216 He also
distinguished the Natomas Basin plan for its quantified objectives and required mitigation measures, even though those
elements could be adjusted.217 These substantive distinctions
allowed Judge Wanger to distinguish the Natomas Basin plan,
which was actually more vaguely drawn than the smelt adaptive matrix.
The pair of Wanger opinions are important for two reasons.
First, they likely contain the most thorough judicial discussion
to date of adaptive management’s strengths and weaknesses.
They recognize a role for adaptive management within administrative law, allowing a “balance” between “flexibility” (adaptive management) and “certainty” (final agency action).218 This
is the fundamental trade-off that courts will continue to mediate in future adaptive management cases. Second, the opinions are important because they draw a line illustrated by two
concrete examples, one on the legal side (salmonids) and one on
the illegal side (smelt). This comparison is particularly significant because the smelt adaptive management protocol was not
at all vague. It was far more detailed than most a/m-lite plans.
Yet, when held against a substantive legal standard, the court
could not find the “reasonable certainty” of compliance.219
It is not surprising that the ESA, with its famously uncompromising mandate,220 would establish a boundary limiting

216. See Natural Res. Def. Council, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 355–56 (emphasis
added).
217. Id. at 356. In contrast, Animal Welfare Institute. v. Beech Ridge Energy, 675 F. Supp. 2d 540 (D. Md. 2009), enjoined construction of a ridge-top,
wind turbine project because of the likely harm to endangered Indiana bats. In
language reminiscent of the smelt biological opinion, the state permit required
the energy company to “consult” with a technical advisory committee regarding the “potential for adaptive management” and agree to “test adaptive management strategies.” Id. at 556. The court found the adaptive management
scheme too discretionary to overcome the need for an incidental take permit
for the bats likely to be harmed. Id. at 579.
218. Pacific Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Gutierrez, 606 F. Supp.
2d 1122, 1188 (E.D. Cal. 2008).
219. Id.; see also Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Servheen, 672 F. Supp. 2d
1105, 1116 (D. Mont. 2009) (holding that a commitment to future monitoring
of the agency designation for grizzly bear populations could not substitute for
substantive findings required in the statute).
220. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184, 194 –95 (1978) (noting
that the ESA intends to “halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction,
whatever the cost,” and thereby strikes a balance “in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities”).
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weak forms of a/m-lite.221 However, several other types of cases
find that adaptive management fails to meet substantive criteria of agency law and policy. Agencies employing adaptive
management to sustain FONSIs justifying a decision not to
prepare an EIS have seen their efforts overturned by courts unconvinced that vague, a/m-lite will assure that the impacts of a
project will not be significant.222 In this respect, a/m-lite may be
better suited to an EIS where mitigation need only be discussed, not assured, than to mitigated FONSIs, which must
create a record of decision demonstrating (generally through
the mitigation measures) the absence of significant impacts.223
The mitigation in the record of decision subsequently binds
agency action, unlike a mitigation discussion in an EIS, which
an agency need not implement.
However, it is possible for an agency to fail to provide
enough detail about mitigation under the more flexible standards of an EIS. Mitigation as open-ended contingency planning
is not unique to adaptive management. The Ninth Circuit recently found the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) Final
EIS for expansion of a gold mine in Nevada to be inadequate
because it failed to assess the effectiveness of mitigation proposed to address possible hydrologic impacts from mine dewa-

221. An early case grappling with adaptive management’s role in meeting
substantive legal standards is Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Daley, 6 F.
Supp. 2d 1139, 1158 (D. Or. 1998), which rejected Oregon’s habitat restoration
program that included watershed councils, monitoring, and adaptive management, as the basis for not listing coho salmon runs. The court found the
program to consist of insufficiently certain “future, voluntary and untested
habitat measures.” Id. at 1159.
222. E.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 457 F.
Supp. 2d 198, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (acknowledging that adaptive management
practices “provide no assurance as to the efficacy of mitigation”); Mountaineers
v. U.S. Forest Serv., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1250 (W.D. Wash. 2006)
(“[A]daptive management strategies . . . amount . . . to a build-first, study later
approach . . . [which is a] violation of NEPA.” (internal quotations omitted)).
223. Two recent, very deferential decisions from Judge Leon illustrate how
nebulously described adaptive management may support EIS mitigation. See,
e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 698 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147–48 (D.D.C.
2010) (upholding an elk management plan with little detail on mitigation
measures to reduce harms of winter elk concentrations); Theodore Roosevelt
Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 605 F. Supp. 2d 263, 279 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351-52 (1989))
(noting that adaptive management fulfills the EIS mitigation requirement,
which only requires discussion of possible measures, not assurance that they
will occur), aff’d, No. 09-5162, 2010 WL 2869778 (D.C. Cir. July 23, 2010).
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tering.224 Without an assessment of effectiveness, the court determined that mitigation cannot fulfill its purpose as described
by the Supreme Court; specifically, to evaluate whether anticipated environmental impacts can be avoided.225 In this case,
the EIS described a monitoring regime and indicated that, if
the monitoring showed mitigation measures were necessary,
then the mining company would prepare a “detailed, sitespecific plan to enhance or replace the impacted perennial water resources.”226 The absence of detail about the tools employed in such a plan, or on when exactly the plan would be
triggered, is common in EISs employing adaptive management
to defer some decisions to a later date. Recent draft guidance
from the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) aims to improve NEPA mitigation by urging agencies to include more specific descriptions of mitigation measures (especially measurable
performance standards) and to ensure that mitigation is carried out.227 Both of these suggestions would significantly improve federal adaptive management, which the CEQ recommends, “in order to minimize the possibility of mitigation
failure.”228
Outside of NEPA, environmental laws frequently impose
substantive standards on agencies that cannot be eluded
through adaptive management. For instance, a federal district
court found that an adaptive management approach to improving storm water phosphorus abatement did not fulfill the legal
requirements of the Clean Water Act, which demand that specific effluent limitations be met.229 Even the public land organic
acts, which grant broad discretion to agencies, including the
latitude to manage adaptively, sometimes provide standards

224. S. Fork Band Council v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 588 F.3d 718, 727
(9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
225. Id. (internal citation omitted).
226. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR: BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., CORTEZ HILLS
EXPANSION PROJECT: FINAL EIS § 3.2, at 111 (2008), available at http://blm
.gov/nv/st/en/fo/battle_mountain_field/blm_information/national_environmental/
cortez_hills_expansion.html.
227. See Memorandum from Nancy H. Sutley, Chair, Council on Envtl.
Quality on Draft Guidance for NEPA Mitigation & Monitoring, 3 (Feb. 18,
2010), available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/Mitigation_and_Monitoring_
Draft_NEPA_Guidance_Final_02182010.pdf.
228. Id. at 4.
229. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. United States, No. 04 -21448, 2010
WL 1506267, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2010).
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that a/m-lite fails to meet.230 Agencies run the risk of relying on
adaptive management as an alternative to the harder work of
showing how their plans will meet the substantive legal criteria
for their land systems.
Moreover, the focus on adaptive management in public
land planning may distract agencies from the hard work of establishing substantive objectives that translate statutory and
regulatory goals into place-based standards.231 Richard L.
Schroeder’s recent study of the comprehensive conservation
plans that each unit of the National Wildlife Refuge System
must prepare under its organic legislation, revealed that the
biological objectives, a key element of the plans required under
implementing policy, seldom meet even two of the five criteria
in the FWS handbook.232 The handbook requires each biological
objective to be: “(1) Specific, (2) Measurable, (3) Achievable, (4)
Results-oriented, and (5) Time-fixed.”233 Schroeder describes
the problem with the plans’ neglect of substantive benchmarks:
If [the FWS] is to be able to manage in a manner consistent with
the plans, and to practice adaptive management by monitoring
progress, then the biological objectives in the plan must be specific

230. E.g., Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Boody, 468 F.3d 549, 558–59
(9th Cir. 2006) (arguing that adaptive management modifications contemplated in a resource management plan do not shield subsequent management
changes from complying with regulations setting out criteria for amending
plans); Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Kempthorne, 577 F. Supp. 2d 183, 195
(D.D.C. 2008) (stating that an adaptive management plan for snowmobiles
“provides no quantitative standard or qualitative analysis to support” a conclusion of no impairment under the park system Organic Act); High Sierra
Hikers Ass’n v. Weingardt, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (illustrating that an agency may not rely on adaptive management to avoid a
showing in the administrative record that it will meet the standards of the
Wilderness Act).
231. See Refuge Planning Policy Pursuant to the National Wildlife Refuge
System Administration Act as Amended by the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,892, 33,906 (May 25, 2000)
(stating that one of the eight goals of unit-level planning is “[to] provide a basis for adaptive management by monitoring progress, evaluating plan implementation, and updating refuge plans accordingly”). Substantive statutory
goals for refuges include ensuring “that the biological integrity, diversity, and
environmental health of the System are maintained,” 16 U.S.C.
§ 668dd(a)(4)(B) (2006), and sustaining “healthy populations of fish, wildlife,
and plants,” 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd(a)(4)(D)–668ee.
232. See Richard L. Schroeder, Evaluating the Quality of Biological Objectives for Conservation Planning in the National Wildlife Refuge System, 26
GEO. WRIGHT F. 22, 25 (2009).
233. Id. at 23 (quoting ROBERT S. ADAMCIK ET AL., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV., WRITING REFUGE MANAGEMENT GOALS AND OBJECTIVES: A HANDBOOK
8 (2004)).
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and measurable, as recognized by [the FWS’s] own policy. If the objectives lack specificity and detail, as the majority do, then [the FWS]
will be unable to measure progress toward their achievement, and
thus, will be unable to know if they are indeed managing refuge lands
in a manner consistent with the plans.234

In their haste to complete plans and to describe adaptive
management procedures, agencies too often neglect the establishment of site-specific standards for measuring compliance
with statutory or regulatory criteria.
III. LESSONS FOR THE NEXT GENERATION OF
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT
The picture that emerges from the first round of litigation
over adaptive management should not surprise observers of
conservation conflicts. One reason the ambitions expressed in
law and policy exceed the abilities of agencies to implement is
inadequate funding.235 Agencies attempt to maximize their discretion and minimize their exposure to political controversy
from unpopular decisions.236 Interest groups, including environmentalists, seek to lock in promises through binding commitments early in the management process.237 Courts are attentive to substantive management standards in reviewing
agency records for compliance with the law. Most environmental managers and stakeholders approve of adaptive management in theory; disagreements focus on application in practice.238 Courts cannot directly distinguish legitimate adaptive
management from imposters.239 But in policing compliance
with administrative and environmental law, courts can unmask
some of the most egregious failures to incorporate the key elements necessary for structured learning during the course of a
project, which often get sidelined in the rough and tumble of
implementation.240 Given the limitations of the judicial role, we
now offer some lessons for agencies and Congress for further
improvement of adaptive management in practice.

234. Id. at 27.
235. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
236. See Doremus, supra note 4, at 56.
237. Id. at 85.
238. See Fred Johnson, Protocol and Practice in the Adaptive Management
of Waterfowl Harvests, 3 CONSERVATION ECOLOGY 8 (June 30, 1999), http://www
.ecologyandsociety.org/vol3/iss1/art8/.
239. See Gregory et al., supra note 72, at 2424.
240. See id.; Doremus, supra note 1, at 569–70.
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A. LESSONS FOR AGENCIES
Our research confirms the intuition that adaptive management is one of the most difficult tasks for agencies attempting comprehensive ecosystem stewardship.241 However, the impression in agencies that lawsuits and appeals present a
barrier to implementing adaptive management242 is unfounded.
When agencies lose challenges to their adaptive management
plans, it is often because their preference for management latitude runs afoul of the need to show they can meet substantive
and procedural standards in statutes, regulations, or even their
own earlier plans. Several strategies can help agencies avoid
that pitfall.
1. Shoring Up a/m-lite in Substance
In order to wring the most benefits from a/m-lite, agencies
should strive to do their best to create plans that include as
many of the elements of adaptive management theory as possible, especially designing management actions as experiments
so that they promote learning to reduce uncertainty. However,
this crucial element of adaptive management is not generally
required by law and courts will not impose it.243 More structured learning would improve a/m-lite by capturing more benefits of adaptive management theory. This reform will need
strong prompting from Congress, agency leadership, and administrative guidance. The courts will, however, impose some
discipline on the use of a/m-lite.
The lessons for an agency embarking on a/m-lite require it
to restrain its enthusiasm for discretion: the plan must be as
detailed as practical. The more vague the a/m-lite, the more
likely that a court will find it inadequate.244 Criteria for measuring success and triggering contingency actions must be clearly articulated in the record of decision.245 Agencies should
commit to monitoring the key criteria and should employ their

241. Tomas M. Koontz & Jennifer Bodine, Implementing Ecosystem Management in Public Agencies: Lessons from the U.S. Bureau of Land Management and the Forest Service, 22 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 60, 60 (2008).
242. Id. at 65–66.
243. See Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 2008) (refusing to take a close look at whether the agency adaptively learned from previous logging before undertaking another, similar logging project).
244. See supra text accompanying note 180.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 176–80.
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data when revising or expanding projects.246 Most important,
adaptive management must have direction—it needs to deploy
its procedural tools to home in on specific goals.
Related to this lesson is that adaptive management cannot
substitute for a showing of reasonable certainty that substantive criteria will be met. The pageantry of procedures and flow
charts may distract agencies from their mandates to achieve
specific environmental objectives. Agencies should resist looking at adaptive management as a short cut around the difficult
task of compiling a record that substantiates claims about such
key tests as viability, nonimpairment, or no jeopardy. Adaptive
plans, to be effective, must translate the substantive standards
of statutes, rules, and manuals into place-based objectives.
2. Improving a/m-lite as Procedure
While substantive standards, where they exist, helpfully
constrain and focus adaptive management, there is also a set of
lessons for agencies involving the procedural charter established by NEPA, which requires all federal agencies to prepare
an EIS for “major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment.”247 Indeed, as the origins of
adaptive management are found in Holling’s critique of conventional environmental impact analysis, it is fitting that NEPA
recently has been the subject of much thinking about how to
promote adaptive management. In 1997, for example, the CEQ
echoed Holling’s assessment that under the traditional NEPA
model “adequate environmental protection depends solely on
the accuracy of the predicted impacts and expected mitigation
results” and that NEPA should be reoriented around
“[a]daptive environmental management.”248 Building on that
theme, the 2003 NEPA Task Force Report, Modernizing NEPA
Implementation, contained a full chapter devoted to “[a]daptive
[m]anagement and [m]onitoring,”249 the gist of which was to
use NEPA to help move federal agencies from the “predict-

246. See supra text accompanying note 138.
247. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006).
248. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS
AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 32 (1997).
249. NEPA TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY: MODERNIZING NEPA IMPLEMENTATION 44 (2003).

2010]

ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT

473

mitigate-implement” model to the “predict-mitigate-implementmonitor-adapt” model.250
NEPA, of course, imposes no enforceable substantive duties on federal agencies and thus cannot mandate adaptive
management.251 Moreover, environmental impact analysis performed under NEPA assumes the conventional front-end comprehensive predecisional form, so it cannot incorporate adaptive management as an assessment tool per se.252 But, the
NEPA Task Force identified two avenues in which adaptive
management and NEPA can usefully intersect in ways consistent with our evaluation of the adaptive management case law
presented in Part II.
First, federal agency actions that employ adaptive management may be in a position to reduce the need for new or
supplemental NEPA analyses when changed conditions require
changes in resource management.253 This is one of the lessons
manifest in the litigation over the NWFP.254 Second, federal actions that employ adaptive management may be in a better position to argue that mitigation measures incorporated in the
federal action and put into effect through adaptive management justify the decision not to prepare a full EIS (i.e., to mitigate to a finding of no significant impact, or FONSI).255 Our review of adaptive management litigation bolsters this claim by
the CEQ only in circumstances where there is an earlier, comprehensive EIS to which the Environmental Assessment
tiers.256

250. Id. at 45.
251. The Supreme Court’s oft-repeated observation is that while “NEPA
does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation[,] . . . its mandate to
the agencies is essentially procedural.” Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978); see also Stryker’s
Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (per curiam) (stating that once an agency has complied with NEPA procedures, the
courts do not question the choice of action the agency has taken).
252. Agencies must prepare the EIS prior to deciding which action to select, and there is no need for subsequent monitoring and assessment to follow
up on the EIS after the agency action has been selected and implemented. See
David R. Hodas, NEPA, Ecosystem Management and Environmental Accounting, 14 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 185, 188 (2000) (describing NEPA’s lack of
post-EIS review as inadequate to support ecosystem management).
253. See NEPA TASK FORCE, supra note 249, at 47.
254. See supra text accompanying note 166.
255. See NEPA TASK FORCE, supra note 249, at 48.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 222–27.
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Hence, whereas the traditional NEPA model provides no
incentive to federal agencies (or the state, local, and private
entities sponsoring the projects federal agencies fund or authorize) to incorporate adaptive management in the actions being
evaluated under NEPA, the Task Force used the prospect of
avoiding having to prepare a full or supplemental EIS as an incentive to do just that. Indeed, in 2007 the Forest Service proposed rules to update its procedures for NEPA compliance with
numerous references to adaptive management built around the
provision that
[a] proposed action or alternative(s) may include adaptive management strategies allowing for adjustment of the action during implementation. If the adjustments to an action are clearly articulated and
pre-specified in the description of the alternative and fully analyzed,
then the action may be adjusted during implementation without the
need for further analysis.257

Similarly, in 2008 the DOI proposed revisions to its NEPA
implementation rules directing that “[b]ureaus should use
adaptive management as part of their decisionmaking
processes, as appropriate, particularly in circumstances where
long-term impacts may be uncertain and future monitoring will
be needed to make necessary adjustments in subsequent implementation decisions.”258
Another theme of NEPA reformers consistent with the case
law on adaptive management has been to encourage more attention to large-scale or programmatic EISs.259 Early-stage
analyses can be difficult to perform because activities may still
be nebulous. But, early and broad evaluations can steer agencies in more effective and environmentally benign directions.260
They are the analyses most likely to actually help agency decisionmakers. The bigger temporal and geographic scales
representing the greatest agency successes in the adaptive
management litigation bolster this general argument of NEPA
reformers. Because adaptive management is expensive, agencies should place their highest funding priorities on large-scale
efforts, which are most likely to yield useful, incremental adjustments over time.261
257. National Environmental Policy Act Procedures, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,998,
46,005 (Aug. 16, 2007).
258. Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of
1969, 73 Fed. Reg. 126, 135 (Jan. 2, 2008).
259. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 248, at 11–13.
260. See id. at 12.
261. See id. at 14.
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Despite fundamentally different assumptions about knowledge and decisionmaking, adaptive management is compatible
with NEPA. Adaptive management is well suited to the NEPA
tiering that natural resources agencies already use adeptly. An
added incentive for agency use of adaptive management in
EISs is that it may raise the threshold for requiring a supplemental EIS should new information emerge. Agencies must be
attentive to the obligation that mitigated FONSIs demonstrate
that impacts will fall below the significance threshold. Adaptive
management alone, without substantive triggers, may not
shoulder the burden.
3. Extending a/m-lite to Pollution Control
The pollution-control side of environmental litigation has
not directly addressed adaptive management. The strong “cooperative federalism” structure of pollution-control law introduces the complications of state implementation that go far
beyond the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta example.262 Pollution control also involves far more regulation of private economic activity than does resource management.263 But the relatively stronger emphasis on meeting substantive criteria, such as
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS),264 in pollution-control law will increasingly provide some lessons for implementing adaptive management. For example, the Fifth Circuit upheld the EPA’s approval of a Texas State
Implementation Plan (SIP), which the Clean Air Act requires to
demonstrate that the state will be able to attain NAAQS.265
The SIP at issue purported to demonstrate that the HoustonGalveston area would comply with the NAAQS for ozone.266
The state was able to devise control measures that would
achieve ninety-four percent of the pollution reduction needed to
attain the NAAQS.267 In order to extract the additional six per262. See Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 207–29 (2005) (contrasting the versions of cooperative federalism in pollution control and resource management).
263. See Robert L. Fischman, The Divides of Environmental Law and the
Problem of Harm in the Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J. 661, 663 (2008)
(discussing the characteristic differences between pollution control and natural resources law). The ESA is a resource management statute that straddles
the divide and does regulate some private activities directly. Id. at 684.
264. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–7409 (2006).
265. BCCA Appeal Grp. v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 355 F.3d 817, 821–22
(5th Cir. 2003).
266. Id. at 822–23.
267. Id. at 838.
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cent reduction, the EPA accepted the SIP’s “enforceable commitment to adopt and implement additional . . . controls.”268
The SIP could not specify what those additional controls would
be, but it did provide “a list of soon-to-be-available, cutting-edge
technologies.”269 The court upheld the EPA determination under the Chevron standard of review.270 The Texas SIP case illustrates how pollution control benefits from large-scale plans
that promise to meet substantive criteria through thousands of
small steps. Texas benefited from the large scale in committing
to additional reductions (six percent) without specifying the exact sources of contribution to that goal. The court’s deferential
standard of review afforded the EPA flexibility to approve the
experiment of meeting the standard through as-yet-unavailable
technology.271 This is a form of narrowing uncertainty over time
that is widely viewed as an attribute of adaptive management.
On the other hand, the EPA recently refused to extend its
flexibility in proposing to disapprove a Texas SIP revision employing a “Flexible Permits” approach to meet the Clean Air
Act’s new source review requirements for industrial sources of
pollution.272 The Texas program would allow individual sources
to exceed standards as long as they provided cumulative emissions reductions on a case-by-case basis.273 The EPA’s proposed
finding emphasized that the state program does not meet the
statutory standards and fails to ensure accountability, compliance, and monitoring.274 These are familiar criticisms of the
a/m-lite plans reviewed in the natural resources litigation.
The EPA recently restructured its Chesapeake Bay Program (CBP) to emphasize adaptive management. The CBP covers a larger area than the Texas SIPs, or even the NWFP. In
268. Id. at 839–40.
269. Id. at 841.
270. Id. at 842.
271. Id. at 841.
272. Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 74 Fed. Reg.
48,480, 48,480 (Sept. 23, 2009). New source review provides for the “regulation
of the modification and construction” of certain stationary sources of air pollution. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(C) (2006).
273. Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 74 Fed. Reg. at
48,485–86.
274. See id. at 48,482. This is consistent with the Miccosukee Tribe rejection of adaptive, incremental improvement through best technology in lieu of
strictly imposed water-quality based, storm-water effluent limitations for
phosphorus in order to meet Clean Water Act substantive requirements. See
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. United States, No. 04 -21448, 2010 WL
1506267, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2010).
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response to a 2007 congressional mandate, the EPA revised its
CBP around four basic components, one of which is adaptive
management.275 In 2009, President Obama ordered the EPA to
work with other federal agencies to implement adaptive management in the CBP.276 However, in contrast to the SIPs, the
CBP has few enforceable criteria (but many quantitative goals)
and its multistate dimension tends to create adaptive management plans focused primarily on the process of coordination.277 With diffuse responsibility, an emphasis on monitoring
and study, and few interim targets, the new CBP has already
received criticism as a helpless giant.278 Nonetheless, we expect
increased use of adaptive management in adjusting water quality standards and total maximum daily loads of pollutants for
impaired bodies of water, such as the Chesapeake Bay.
4. Public and Industry Buy-In
The courts are not the only institution reviewing adaptive
management. Private regulated interests have expressed concerns about the capacity of adaptive management to add continually to the conditions imposed by resource development authorizations without the security of finality. The Army Corps,
for example, heard this complaint as it developed adaptive
management provisions in the new wetlands compensatory
mitigation rule:
275. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CBP/TRS-292-08, STRENGTHENING THE
MANAGEMENT, COORDINATION, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE CHESAPEAKE
BAY PROGRAM, at ii–iii (2008) [hereinafter CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM], available at http://cap.chesapeakebay.net/docs/EPA_Chesapeake_Bay_CAP.pdf.
276. Chesapeake Bay Protection and Restoration, Exec. Order No. 13,508,
74 Fed. Reg. 23,099, 23,101–03 (May 15, 2009) (directing the EPA in section
301(b) to draft pollution-control strategies that are “based on sound science
and reflect adaptive management principles” and noting in section 801 that
the DOI is to use “adaptive management to plan, monitor, evaluate, and adjust environmental management actions”).
277. See, e.g., CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, supra note 275, at 26 (listing
quantitative goals with adaptive management strategies); id. at 34 (providing
the CBP management system diagram illustrating a detailed procedural
method).
278. See Rena Steinzor & Shana Campbell Jones, Reauthorizing the Chesapeake Bay Program: Exchanging Promises for Results 1 (Ctr. for Progressive
Reform, Working Paper No. 903, 2009). The detailed management system is
reminiscent of the ecosystem management model skewered by Professor
Houck for lack of substance and neglect of lawmaking. See Oliver Houck, On
the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81 MINN. L. REV. 869,
937–39 (1997) (“Nothing better illustrates the potential benefit and reach of
ecosystem management, and its latent danger, than the Inner Columbia Basin
story . . . .”).
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One commenter suggested that if a permittee has made a “good faith
effort” to meet performance standards, no additional compensatory
mitigation requirements should be imposed other than an extension
of the monitoring period. Several commenters said that requiring
adaptive management efforts beyond what is currently required as
remediation or contingency actions will impose additional financial
and resource burdens on mitigation providers.279

The agency’s response was a Solomonic mixed bag. On the
one hand, the Army Corps acknowledged the reality that “there
may be additional costs associated with an adaptive management approach, but we believe that such an approach is necessary to achieve compensatory mitigation project objectives, or
to provide comparable or superior ecological benefits.”280 Yet,
the agency did clarify that the scope of adaptive management is
not boundless, noting that “adaptive management does not require anticipation of all potential challenges, since that would
be impossible to accomplish.”281 This is unlikely to be of comfort
to regulated interests, however, as it leaves much to the details
of the adaptive management plan and subsequent implementation. As we conclude from our case law evaluation, courts may
find this approach too open-ended if the plan is not sufficiently
detailed to assure substantive compliance.
Just as regulated interests are concerned that adaptive
management will lead to runaway land management burdens,
environmental protection interests are concerned that it will
lead to closed-door resource development approvals. For example, as FWS brought adaptive management on line for the HCP
permit program under the ESA,282 environmentalists complained about inadequate access to meaningful public participation in the HCP negotiation process and the lack of an ongoing public role in the implementation of adaptive management
over the life of the HCP permit.283 By the late 1990s, environmental groups had begun to accuse the HCP of making deci279. Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed.
Reg. 19,594, 19,647 (Apr. 10, 2008).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 19,620.
282. See supra notes 2, 6 and accompanying text.
283. See, e.g., LAURA C. HOOD, FRAYED SAFETY NETS: CONSERVATION
PLANNING UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT, at vi–xiii (1998) (presenting
a pessimistic assessment of the HCP program); John Kostyack, Surprise!, 15
ENVTL. F., Mar.–Apr. 1998, at 19, 19–24 (presenting an extensive criticism of
the HCP program from the perspective of an attorney for the National Wildlife
Federation); cf. Robert D. Thornton, Habitat Conservation Plans: Frayed Safety Nets or Creative Partnerships?, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 94, 95–96
(2001) (describing criticism from other organizations).
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sions without following “biological standards” and to demand
more public participation as a result.284 For example, in 1999
the Defenders of Wildlife issued a blistering critique of the HCP
program, complaining that, among other things,
[c]itizens from various stakeholder groups have no formal role in the
HCP process except through the public comment period and . . . generally have not had a seat at the negotiating table in many major recent negotiations despite the fact that conservationists (in addition to
FWS) represent the public’s interest in protecting endangered species.285

Since then, some HCPs have been found by courts to contain robust adaptive management provisions that detail a comprehensive monitoring and adjustment protocol and specify the
kinds of events and responses for which adjustments will be
made.286 FWS has also joined other state and federal agencies
to develop detailed technical guidance for monitoring protocols
to assist adaptive management in large-scale HCPs.287 Yet,
public participation of the kind demanded has yet to be made a
component of HCP adaptive management implementation. The
pressure for more public input on this and other aspects of HCP
284. See, e.g., HOOD, supra note 283, at 59–61, 80–81 (summarizing the Defenders of Wildlife’s critique of the HCP program).
285. Id. at 41; see also Holly Doremus, Preserving Citizen Participation in
the Era of Reinvention: The Endangered Species Act Example, 25 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 707, 712–15 (1999) (examining the growing tension between the HCP and
other ESA reform programs and public participation values).
286. For an example, see Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, 202 F. Supp. 2d 594 (W.D. Tex. 2002). This case involved a
dispute between plaintiff Center for Biological Diversity environmental group
and defendant-intervener La Cantera, a commercial development company,
regarding 750 acres of land in Bexar County, Texas. Id. at 597. The FWS issued an Incidental Take Permit to La Cantera, and the plaintiff challenged
virtually every aspect of the permit, including the adequacy of the adaptive
management provisions, but lost on every claim notwithstanding the court’s
expressed aversion to allowing development in habitat of endangered species.
The court’s discussion of the adaptive management provisions emphasized the
comprehensive and detailed nature of the monitoring and response protocols.
See id. at 616. Seven years later, after reviewing an annual report the court
required to be filed each year describing management actions under the permit, the court issued an order congratulating the permittee and agency “for
coming to this positive result and a fine example of corporate citizenship.” Ctr.
for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. SA-01-CA-1139-FB
(W.D. Tex, May 5, 2009) (order acknowledging annual report on file with author). In the interest of full disclosure, Professor Ruhl served as a consultant
to the HCP applicant in the case.
287. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR ET AL., DESIGNING MONITORING
PROGRAMS IN AN ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT CONTEXT FOR REGIONAL MULTIPLE
SPECIES CONSERVATION PLANS 10–40 (2004), available at http://www.dfg.ca
.gov/habcon/nccp/publications.html.
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permits thus continues to build.288 We expect similar issues to
develop in other permitting and approval programs using adaptive management.289
Neither the regulated industry certainty nor the public
participation concern has surfaced in claims brought against
adaptive management in the courts to date, and no court has
expressed concern in either respect sua sponte. This probably is
due more to the hybrid nature of a/m-lite than it is to the underlying justifications for the respective concerns. Agencies
practicing a/m-lite do so against the context of conventional
natural resources management laws, which tend not to specify
conditions for regulated party certainty and which prescribe
fairly minimal public participation in the form of notice and
comment. So long as an agency satisfies the black-letter requirements of statutes in these respects, courts are unlikely to
nullify use of a/m-lite on these grounds. By the same token,
however, the black-letter law also constrains how far agencies
can go with a/m-lite, as truly iterative “learning while doing”
may at some point run afoul of permitting procedures and criteria, as well as the demands of public notice and comment.
Our message to agencies in this respect is not to take the absence of these concerns registering in the case law to date as
evidence that there is no limit to how far agencies can implement a/m-lite without regard to regulated industry and public
interests. Stretch it too far in either respect and the lawsuits
are sure to come.
B. LESSONS FOR CONGRESS
Even if agencies follow the lessons we have extracted from
the existing adaptive management case law, which we believe
would reduce adverse judicial reaction, the most they could
hope for is to be able to implement a disciplined form of a/mlite. The courts cannot provide the funding necessary to support true “learning while doing,” and neither can they supply
more authority or clearer standards than exist in existing statutory text. Only Congress can let agencies break out of the a/mlite mold without fear of public, industry, and judicial push288. For a recent evaluation of the HCP program, including a proposal for
more public participation, see David Dana, Reforming Section 10 and the Habitat Conservation Program 12–17 (Nw. Univ. School of Law & Econ., Working
Paper No. 09-44), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1519515.
289. For example, the public participation issue confronted the NEPA Task
Force as well. See NEPA TASK FORCE, supra note 249, at 51.
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back. Of course, Congress is not bound to follow the lead the
courts have given agencies, but we believe Congress would be
well advised to codify judicial guideposts for determining when
the practical demands on adaptive management warrant departure from the pristine theory and when, on the other hand,
the agencies have given themselves too long a leash.
On the funding question, it is time for Congress to consider
supporting adaptive management plans through the purchase
of annuities that would ensure a steady stream of subsequent
funding for the development of management experiments, monitoring, and revision.290 Current appropriation practice, which
provides most funding for the first stage of planning and not for
the subsequent iterations, is inadequate to reap significant
benefits from adaptive management. Prior efforts, most notably
through the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974,291 failed in disciplining Congress to make
strategic investments in resource management.292 The 1974
statute established an elaborate planning regime which viewed
forests as capital assets requiring reliable future funding to
maintain their value. It required an annual “Statement of Reasons” from the President explaining deviations of proposed
budgets from the needed funds projected in long-term plans,
but both branches ignored the well-intentioned legislation.293
Creating endowments or purchasing annuities are more concrete assurances of follow-through and deserve further exploration. This would be a timely project as Congress considers climate change legislation that may provide new revenues from
sales of emission allowances.294 In the absence of congressional
290. Examples abound of agencies unable to afford the monitoring described in adaptive plans. A common scenario is national forests unable to
fund the monitoring of indicator species populations identified in forest plans.
See, e.g., Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 999–1001, 1000 n.12 (9th
Cir. 2008); Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth, 439 F.3d 1184, 1190–97 (10th Cir.
2006); Sierra Club v. Martin, 168 F.3d 1, 3–8 (11th Cir. 1999); Inland Empire
Pub. Lands Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 763–65 (9th Cir. 1996);
see also W. Watersheds Project v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. CV-05-189-E-BLW,
2006 WL 292010, at *4 –8 (D. Idaho 2006) (identifying inadequate funding for
the Forest Service to apply forest plan standards relating to grazing suitability
using on-the-ground studies).
291. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1613 (2006).
292. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. United States, 626 F.2d 917, 919–20 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); GEORGE C. COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND
RESOURCES LAW 690 (6th ed. 2007).
293. COGGINS ET AL., supra note 292, at 690.
294. See Glicksman, supra note 4, at 873. The leading bills in both the House
and Senate provide substantial funding for natural resource conservation.
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action, agencies should at least use NEPA to disclose funding
needs for adaptive management and the environmental effects
that would result from failure to find the means for implementation of monitoring, mitigation, or adjustment.295
In addition to reforming the appropriations process, Congress could substantially improve the practice of adaptive management in natural resource administration. It is possible to establish clearer standards to ensure that an agency purporting
to employ adaptive management actually does an adequate job.
Congress should explicitly require adaptive management plans
to (1) clearly articulate measurable goals, (2) identify testable
hypotheses (or some other method of structured learning from
conceptual models), and (3) state exactly what criteria should
apply in evaluating the management experiments. These requirements would address the vast majority of nonbudgetary
problems with a/m-lite. With explicit learning goals and established measures of success, agencies could retain discretion to
adjust their decisions while offering far greater assurances to
stakeholders.
Assuring future funding and requiring that the experimental elements of adaptive management be more precisely defined
would address both the disparities we noted at the beginning of
Part II.C. of this Article. These elements would provide judicially enforceable benchmarks for oversight of natural resources planning and management. They would also rein in the
a/m-lite practices that currently serve as open-ended contingency planning by ensuring that all adaptive management
plans get the benefit of the scientific method to guide future
iterations. In narrowing the disparities, they would wring more
benefits from adaptive management by reducing uncertainty as
plans move forward.296 True, adaptive management in practice
would remain a somewhat grotesque hybrid of conservation policy’s complexity theory and modern administrative law’s approach to pluralism and finality. But it would likely achieve
more of the benefits we wish to extract from ecosystems with
less rancor.
Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009); American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
295. See Memorandum from Nancy H. Sutley, supra note 227, at 4 (recommending disclosure of these needs and effects relating to mitigation); id. at
7 (citing U.S. Army NEPA regulations assuring effective mitigation by barring
actions until mitigation measures are fully funded or until lack of funding is
addressed in the NEPA analysis, 32 C.F.R. § 651.15(a)(5)(d)).
296. Doremus, supra note 1, at 569.
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The federal government has noted that “[c]limate change
creates new situations of added complexity for which an adaptive management approach may be the only way to take management action today while allowing for increased understanding and refinement tomorrow.”297 Commentators agree, and
there are currently no viable alternative approaches to respond
to the increased uncertainties surrounding conservation.298
Therefore, the stakes are high for public agencies to refine their
approach to adaptive management in light of the lessons from
the first generation of litigation.
CONCLUSION
Our review of the first generation of adaptive management
litigation provides more than an analysis of how the law applies or the reaction of the judiciary. It also opens a window into the actual practices that agencies have justified under the
title adaptive management. Not surprisingly, implementation
fails to mirror the finely wrought theory of adaptive management. The litigation reflects the practical and political compromises agencies make, whether applying adaptive management or any other model of natural resources management
decisionmaking. It highlights how rarely real learning and reduced uncertainly result, and how haphazardly they feed back
into agency programs. But it also points the way toward improved implementation and legislative reform.
The next round of lawsuits over adaptive management will
likely focus on how well the procedures developed in large-scale
plans have fulfilled their promise. Only the NWFP is old
enough to have experienced much second-generation litigation.
However, agencies should prepare by being careful about what
they promise. The temptation to defer difficult and costly analysis, or punt on politically controversial decisions, may create
problems for agencies down the line. What might have been a
routine implementation project may explode into an expensive,
complex task if the initial a/m-lite failed to commit to a course
of action, applied only vague criteria for evaluating actions, or
deferred substantial analysis of site-specific effects.

297. JILL S. BARON ET AL., PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF ADAPTATION OPTIONS
CLIMATE-SENSITIVE ECOSYSTEMS AND RESOURCES 25 (Susan Herrod Julius & Jordan M. West eds., 2008), available at http://www.climatescience.gov/
Library/sap/sap4 -4/final-report/#finalreport.
298. See Glicksman, supra note 4, at 871.
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One must wonder, however, about how much time we have
for lessons to come out of the second generation of adaptive
management litigation. The pressure on Congress, agencies,
the courts, and all natural resources policy stakeholders to further refine, implement, and work within a regime of adaptive
management is not about to let up. There is widespread agreement, for example, that the effects of climate change on natural
resources will be complex, dynamic, nonlinear, and frequently
unpredictable over anything but short time frames, all of which
are conditions that demand adaptive management responses.299
Yet, although the first generation of litigation seems to have
laid down some important foundational lessons for this effort,
doing so took a span of roughly fifteen years. Adaptive management litigation now risks getting down in the weeds, so to
speak, and must avoid letting the perfect be the enemy of the
good at a time when decisive action is needed. Our assessment
of adaptive management in the courts suggests there is a good
model in place. If agencies follow it and courts enforce it faithfully, it may serve as a potent component of climate change policy notwithstanding its flaws.

299. See Camacho, supra note 138, at 64 (calling for “an adaptive methodology for assessing and adjusting government decision making over time”);
Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity Is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five
Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9,
65–67 (2010) (“Be serious about using adaptive management—and change
both natural resources and administrative laws to allow for it.”); Glicksman,
supra note 4, at 868 (“The land management agencies, in the planning process
as well as in other contexts, must rely heavily on the management technique
known as adaptive management.”); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and
the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 416–
23 (2010) (discussing greater need for adaptive management to implement
climate change adaptation policy). Experts from environmental organizations,
such as the Environmental Law Institute’s Carl Bruch, concur in the important role adaptive management will play in climate change policy. See Carl
Bruch, The End of Equilibrium, ENVTL. F., Sept.–Oct. 2008, at 30, 32 (“Incorporating adaptive management into laws and institutions can enhance the capacity of governance systems and ecosystems to adapt to changing climactic
conditions, to develop and deploy new technologies and techniques.”).

